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Abstract
Social research is in large parts based on the analysis of survey data. Therefore, the
ability to draw valid inferences from survey data depends heavily on the quality of
these data. The statistical field of Survey Methodology investigates how to construct
high-quality surveys.
This thesis contributes to the field of survey methodology by analyzing correlates
of survey nonresponse and measurement error. We are able to use the administra-
tive data from the German federal employment agency to study these error sources.
The data cover a huge part of the German population and hold rich information on
employment histories, job seeking, labor market program participation, and receipt
of welfare benefit. The samples of the surveys we are analyzing are drawn from ad-
ministrative records so that we have useful information on survey respondents and
nonrespondents. Respondents are asked to allow us to link their survey responses
to the administrative data to enrich the data set. For all respondents who consented
to the data linkage, we are able to compare some of their survey responses to their
records in the administrative data which we use as a gold standard.
Using these data, three studies analyzing survey data quality are presented. In the
first study, the administrative data are used as a rich sample frame to analyze the
effects of two different kinds of incentives on nonresponse bias within the German
household panel survey “Panel Labor Market and Social Security” (PASS) conducted
by the German Institute for Employment Research. Our question is whether nonre-
sponse bias differs in two incentive schemes, unconditional prepaid cash and condi-
tional post-paid lottery ticket. Using the administrative data as a gold standard for
all sample cases, respondents and nonrespondents, we find that the former incentive
scheme is more effective than the latter.
In the second study, we analyze the possibility to increase response quality by ask-
ing respondents to think hard about the next question and giving them a special
incentive during the interview. We study different indicators for the quality of an-
swers to the survey questions: The amount of “don’t know”s and “no answer”s, as
well as heaping and rounding of numerical items. Moreover, we are able to validate
some survey responses by comparing them to the administrative records. We find the
request to think hard and the additional incentives to affect item nonresponse in some
of our questions. However, there is no evidence for general patterns regarding any of
our quality indicators.
The third study is concerned with item nonresponse and measurement error in
income questions. In particular, we investigate whether these two errors depend on a
person’s income itself, and whether this relationship is different for different survey
modes, telephone and web survey. We find that item nonresponse and measurement
iii
error are related to a person’s income. Moreover, we confirm the often reported
finding of mean-reverting measurement error. While the relationship between item
nonresponse and a person’s income is different for the web and telephone modes, the
modes do not show different relationships between measurement error and a person’s
income.
iv
Zusammenfassung
Viele Studien der empirischen Sozialforschung überprüfen den Wahrheitsgehalt sozi-
ologischer Theorien durch die statistische Analyse von Befragungsdaten. Die Aus-
sagekraft solcher sozialwissenschaftlicher Studien hängt somit entscheidend von der
Qualität der zu Grunde liegenden Daten ab. Die statistische Teildisziplin der Survey-
Methodologie untersucht, wie Umfragen so durchgeführt werden können, dass die
Qualität der erhobenen Daten möglichst hoch ist.
Der zentrale Beitrag der vorliegenden Arbeit zur survey-methodologischen For-
schung ist die Analyse der Einflussfaktoren von Nonresponse (Teilnahmeverweigerung)
und Messfehler. Für die Analyse dieser beiden Fehlerquellen wurden Daten der Bun-
desagentur für Arbeit verwendet, welche einen Großteil der deutschen Bevölkerung
erfassen und umfassende Informationen über die Erwerbshistorien, Arbeitssuchen,
Teilnahme an Maßnahmen der Bundesagentur und den Bezug von Transferleistun-
gen liefern. Die Stichproben für die im Rahmen dieser Dissertation analysierten Um-
fragen wurden aus den Daten der Bundesagentur gezogen, so dass Informationen
sowohl über Respondenten als auch über Non-Respondenten verfügbar sind. Die Re-
spondenten wiederum wurden um ihre Zustimmung zur Verbindung ihrer Umfrage-
und offiziellen Daten gebeten. Für all diejenigen Respondenten, die dieser Verbin-
dung zustimmten, können die im Rahmen der Umfrage gegebenen Antworten direkt
mit den administrativen Daten der Bundesagentur, unserem Goldstandard, verglichen
werden.
Die Arbeit präsentiert drei Studien, in welchen die Daten der Bundesagentur zur
Untersuchung verschiedener Qualitätsaspekte der Befragungsdaten Verwendung fin-
den. In der ersten Studie werden die administrativen Daten verwendet, um die Ef-
fekte zweier verschiedener Arten von Belohnungen (Incentives) auf den Nonresponse
Bias in der deutschen Haushalts-Panelbefragung “Panel Arbeitsmarkt und soziale
Sicherung” (PASS) zu untersuchen, welche vom Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung (IAB) durchgeführt wird. Die zentrale Frage ist, ob sich die durch Ant-
wortverweigerung entstehende Verzerrung zwischen den beiden Belohnungsarten –
im Voraus geleistete Barzahlung unabhängig von der Teilnahme vs. im Falle der Teil-
nahme versprochene Gabe eines Lotterie-Loses – unterscheidet. Die Analyse ergibt,
dass die erstere Belohnungsart effektiver als die letztere ist.
In der zweiten Studie wird die Möglichkeit untersucht, die Qualität der Antwor-
ten durch zwei Arten von Maßnahmen zu erhöhen: Die zusätzliche Aufforderung,
sich bei der nächsten Frage besonders anzustrengen, und eine zusätzliche Beloh-
nung während des Interviews. Verschiedene Indikatoren der Antwortqualität wer-
den hierzu untersucht: Der Anteil der Antworten “weiß nicht” und “keine Antwort”
sowie die Anteile der Antworten, in denen sog. “Jubiläumszahlen” oder gerundete
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Werte angegeben werden. Des Weiteren werden einige der Befragungsantworten mit
Hilfe der administrativen Daten validiert. Es ergibt sich, dass die Aufforderung, sich
anzustrengen, und die zusätzlichen Belohnungen für manche, aber nicht alle Fragen
die Neigung zu den Antworten “weiß nicht” und “keine Antwort” beeinflussen. Al-
lerdings zeigt sich kein klares Muster für die Qualitätsindikatoren.
Die dritte Studie befasst sich mit Antwortverweigerung und Messfehler in Einkom-
mensfragen, speziell mit dem Zusammenhang dieser beiden Fehlerquellen und dem
persönlichen Einkommen der Befragten, sowie der Frage, ob diese Zusammenhänge
sich für unterschiedliche Erhebungsmodi – Web und Telefon – unterscheiden. Es
zeigt sich, dass Antwortverweigerung und Messfehler mit dem persönlichen Einkom-
men zusammen hängen. Der häufig berichtete “mean-reverting”-Effekt des persön-
lichen Einkommens auf den Einkommensmessfehler wird bestätigt. Während sich
der Zusammenhang zwischen Antwortverweigerung und persönlichem Einkommen
zwischen den Erhebungsmodi unterscheidet, zeigen die Modi keinen Unterschied im
Zusammenhang zwischen persönlichem Einkommen und Einkommensmessfehler.
vi
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1
Introduction
Survey data quality has many dimensions (Biemer et al., 2014; Biemer, 2010), and
at least three dimensions can be distinguished (Biemer and Lyberg, 2003): accuracy,
timeliness, and accessibility. A well known framework to discuss survey data accu-
racy is the total survey error framework (Groves and Lyberg, 2010; Groves et al., 2009).
Total survey error (TSE) is defined as the difference of a population parameter and
an estimation of this parameter based on a population survey. All steps in the survey
process can contain errors that all sum up to total survey error. In general, two sides
of the survey life cycle can be distinguished: first, the measurement side that starts by
defining a construct to be measured, and then moves on with designing a question
to measure this construct, collecting answers in interviews and editing the answers.
Second, the representation side, which consists of defining a target population and a
corresponding sample frame, drawing the sample, and surveying the sample of re-
spondents. Groves and Lyberg (2010) point out that there are two inferential steps in
all surveys, one in each of the two parts of the survey life cycle. The first inference is
from the survey response of a single respondent to the measurement of an underly-
ing construct. The second inference is from the group of survey respondents to the
relevant target population.
Let us, for example, consider the problem of estimating the general life satisfaction
of people living in Germany. The general life satisfaction is the underlying construct
of primary interest which survey participants may be asked for by using, say, a 7-
point happiness scale. At this stage, it is crucial that the scale really measures a
respondent’s underlying life satisfaction rather than, e.g., some temporary mood. The
second inference is from the survey respondents to all people living in Germany. At
this stage, the main challenge is to make sure that the survey respondents can be
considered as a realization of a random sample from the German population.
The example illustrates that both inferential steps can be subject to a variety of
errors. First, the measurement might not be valid for the underlying construct. A
lack of validity is in our case given if the survey question fails to convey some general
1
1 Introduction
aspect of happiness. Second, the survey response might not equal the measurement,
but show measurement error. This can be the case if a respondent is unable to choose the
response option that matches her true happiness. Third, the sample frame might not
cover all cases of the target population. Coverage error can, for example, occur if people
who do not permanently live in Germany are part of the sample. Fourth, the sample
might not be a random subset of the target population and lead to sampling error.
This will for example be the case if listers do not follow random walk protocols. Fifth,
survey respondents systematically differ from nonrespondents. Such nonresponse error
can for example occur if only people who are satisfied with their lives respond to the
survey. As errors caused in each step sum up to the TSE, leading to decreasing survey
data quality, each step has to be implemented with caution.
All error sources can lead to severe bias in a survey estimate and/or increase the
estimate’s variance. A useful quantity that accounts for both aspects is the mean
squared error (MSE). The MSE of a survey estimate is given by the squared bias
plus the variance. The MSE is always a characteristic of a single estimate, and not a
measure for the whole survey. Thus, the MSE can be large for some survey estimates
while being small for others.
To compute the TSE, some sort of gold standard is needed to compare the survey
estimate to, e.g., means and totals from census data. However, aggregate information
for the target population does not suffice to decompose TSE to its error components.
For example, underestimation of the mean age in a survey as compared to census data
can be due to overcoverage of young cases in the target population, oversampling of
young cases from the sample frame, higher response rates among younger sample
cases, or underreporting of age in the survey. Only if the gold standard information
is available for all cases of the target population on an individual level, the single
components of TSE can be identified.
For this thesis, we are able to make use of information from administrative records
from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) that allow
us to decompose TSE to its single error sources. We primarily focus on two compo-
nents of TSE: nonresponse and measurement error.
Nonresponse The fact that not all sampled cases are responding to a survey does
not necessarily lead to a bias in survey estimates, but always affects the variance
part of the MSE (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008). However, if nonrespondents differ
from respondents systematically, estimates based on survey respondents will lead
to biased estimates of the target population. Differences between respondents and
nonrespondents can usually only be observed for some socio-demographics that are
part of the sample frame, but not for key survey variables. As bias is not directly
observable, but the response rates are, and because it is often assumed that high
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response rates lead to higher quality than low response rates, many effort is put into
increasing response rates. Response rates are found to depend on many aspects of the
survey (Groves et al., 2002): professional invitation letters, recruitment, interviewer
behavior and interviewer-respondent interaction in personal surveys, the survey topic,
the survey burden, the ease of the questionnaire, the number of call attempts, the use
of incentives, and many more. All aspects that influence response rates might affect
nonresponse bias as well. In this thesis, we will study nonresponse bias by comparing
respondents and nonrespondents based on administrative data.
Survey measurement error is defined by Groves et al. (2009, p. 52) as
“a departure from the true value of the measurement as applied to a sample unit
and the value provided”.
Differences between the true and reported values can exist for many reasons: a re-
spondent might not understand the question, not know the answer, not be willing to
search her memory for the right answer, or just decide to report a wrong value. Re-
spondents might decide not to answer a question, or to give a wrong answer because
the correct answer is socially not desired, or they do not want to share the information
because it is too personal and private.
If respondents are not motivated to give the best answer they can, they can choose to
give a satisficing answer, i.e., an answer that is acceptable or appears to be reasonable
(Krosnick, 1991). Satisficing can take various forms, like rounding and heaping of con-
tinuous data, randomly choosing answer categories, non-differentiation, the choice of
middle categories, and acquiescence. The propensity for a respondent to show satis-
ficing behavior is found to be positively correlated with the difficulty of the task, and
negatively correlated with the respondent’s motivation and the respondent’s ability
to solve the task. Measurement error in general can be due to characteristics of the
questions and characteristics of the respondent. Strategies to minimize measurement
error should therefore be applied on both levels, i.e., questions need to be as clear,
unambiguous, and easy to understand as possible, and the interview burden needs
to be as low as possible to keep the respondent motivated. Like nonresponse error,
measurement error will always affect the variance part of the MSE. If it is systematic,
it will also have a negative impact on the bias part.
Two design features that are often discussed in terms of nonresponse and mea-
surement error will be analyzed in this thesis: the use of incentives (Singer and Ye,
2013) and the choice of the survey mode. It is well known that incentives can effec-
tively be used to increase response rates — cash incentives are more effective than
in-kind incentives, prepaid ones are more effective than post-paid ones, and higher
incentives are found to increase response rates more than lower ones — but it is not
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clear whether incentives also affect nonresponse bias and measurement error (Med-
way, 2012). Although many studies exist that analyze the effect of incentives on
sample composition and satisficing behavior, studies using validation data are rare.
The influence on survey response has often been analyzed by comparing response
distributions between incentive groups. However, such an approach does not allow
to attribute differences to one of the error sources: distributions might differ because
different sample cases select themselves to the survey, or because measurement error
differs between the groups. Different survey modes — e.g. personal interviews, tele-
phone interviews, and web surveys — are known to attract different kinds of sample
cases. There is also some evidence that measurement error differs by survey mode
(Kreuter et al., 2008). This work contributes to a deeper understanding of the effect of
incentives and survey mode on nonresponse and measurement error.
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: The data sources that are used
throughout the thesis are introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is an evaluation of the
effects of different incentive schemes on nonresponse bias in the large-scale German
panel survey “Panel Arbeitsmarkt und soziale Sicherung”.
Chapter 4 deals with the question whether survey measurement error can be de-
creased by within-survey incentives. Chapter 5 studies the effect of telephone vs. web
mode on item nonresponse and measurement error in income questions.
Contributions by Advisors
The main parts of Chapter 3, “The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Nonresponse
Bias in a Household Panel”, are joint work with Gerrit Müller, Frauke Kreuter, and
Joachim Winter. The incentive experiment that is analyzed in the Chapter was planned
and conducted by the team of the “Panel Arbeitsmarkt und soziale Sicherung” of the
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung. The paper idea was put forward by
Gerrit Müller, who also gave me advice when analyzing the data and writing the
manuscript. Frauke Kreuter and Joachim Winter provided helpful suggestions.
The fourth Chapter, “The Influence of Within-Survey Incentives on Response Qual-
ity in a Web Survey”, is joint work with Frauke Kreuter and Joachim Winter. It was
Frauke’s idea to design an experiment to ask respondents to give good answers, and
she gave me the opportunity to field my experiment in an IAB survey. Setting up the
experiment was done in close cooperation with Joachim Winter and Frauke Kreuter,
and both advised me when writing the Chapter.
Chapter 5 “Item Nonresponse and Measurement Error in Income Questions” bene-
fitted greatly from suggestions by Joachim Winter and Frauke Kreuter.
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Data Sources
Throughout the thesis, survey data quality is evaluated by linking survey data to
administrative records of the German Federal Employment Agency (FEA). All surveys
were conducted by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) and are described in
the following Sections.
2.1 Administrative Data of the German Federal
Employment Agency
The FEA holds the employers’ notifications to the German pension fund (employment
history (Beschäftigtenhistorik BeH)) and process-generated data from the FEA. These
contain the benefit recipient history (Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung (LHG) and
Leistungsempfängerhistorik (LeH)), records about participation in labor market pro-
grams (Maßnahmeteilnahmehistorik (MTH)), and job seeker history (Arbeitsuchen-
denhistorik (ASU)). The data are only available internally to researchers working for
or associated with the IAB, in form of single-data products or combined in the in-
tegrated employment biographies (IEB). The latter is also available for external re-
searchers in the form of a subsample of the IEB (Oberschachtsiek et al., 2009).
The IEB data contain
• individual day-to-day employment and wage spells from 1975 to present. The
data do not contain information on civil servants or self-employed. In total,
nearly 80% of the German labor force are covered (and almost 100% of the em-
ployees liable to social security).
• individual unemployment insurance spells since 1975.
• detailed information on participation in training programs and individual job
seeking history since 2000.
• social security benefit information since 2005 on the level of benefit communities.
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Our analyses focus on the BeH and LHG which are explained in more detail.
2.1.1 BeH
Every employee who holds a job subject to the social security system is covered by the
BeH data set. Employers are obliged to regularly transmit detailed information about
their employees (Meldung zur Sozialversicherung) to the German pension fund. The
information is used to calculate social security contributions, pension claims, and
unemployment insurance. The parts of the employer’s notification that contain the
information that is analyzed in this thesis can be found in Figure 2.1. Each notification
includes personal information about the employee, i.e., the security number, name,
and place of residence. Employees are sent a copy of the employer’s notification to
check the information and inform their employer about errors. Employers are asked
to send their corrections to the social security system, and the administrative data are
updated accordingly.
Figure 2.1: Employer’s notification form to social security.
In the following, the items on the notification form that are of special interest for our
analyses are described in more detail:
Grund der Abgabe denotes the reason for the notification. There are three main
groups of reasons for notifications: registration of a new employment, notification
of the end of an employment, and yearly notifications or special notifications. Begin
and end of employments have to be notified to the pension fund immediately. The
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most common is the yearly notification that covers the whole year. It has to be sent
to the pension fund for every employee in every year. In general, all changes in the
employment situation that are important for the social-security system need to be
transmitted to the German pension fund. We are able to construct full employment
episodes from the notifications when taking the reasons for notification into account.
Beschäftigungszeit Each notification includes the exact start and end date of ev-
ery employment. For the yearly notification, start and end date are January 1st and
December 31, respectively. The maximum length of the spell is one year.
Personengruppe An indicator of the kind of job is also included in each notification.
For us, this information is important as it indicates whether a respondent has a regular
job, or is marginally employed.
Angabe zur Tätigkeit Additional information about the employment type is re-
ported in a 9-digit number that includes keys (Tätigkeitsschlüssel) for the kind of
job, information about educational degree, vocational training (Berufsausbildung) of
the employee, and information on the contract. The contract information includes an
indicator for subcontract work (Leiharbeit), and indicators for fixed-term contracts as
well as full- or part time employment. We use this information to derive indicators
for part-time and full-time employment.
Schlüssel der Staatsangehörigkeit The nationality of the employee can also be found
in the notification.
Beitragspflichtiges Bruttoarbeitsentgelt The gross income for the whole employ-
ment spell is notified to the social security system. Usually, this includes monthly
payments and bonus payments, if existent. However, in some cases employers de-
cide to send extra notifications for bonus payments. Note that income notifications
are censored by the social security contribution assessment ceiling (“Beitragsbemes-
sungsgrenze"): any amount above this threshold is censored at the assessment ceiling
which is different for every year and also differs between East and West Germany. The
income reports are known to be very accurate as they are very important and misre-
porting is sanctioned. We use the gross income information to derive a respondent’s
monthly income.
The notifications also contain additional information on the job and a unique estab-
lishment number. All notifications, as of 1975, are collected in the BeH data set. Every
notification is thereby represented in one row of the data set. A short data example
that is reduced to key variables can be found in Table 2.1. Note that a person can
have different spells at the same time, as can be seen for the person with ID 2 in the
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example who has two mini jobs in 2013. Bonuses are reported separately from the
monthly income in a special notification for person 2. The start and end dates of this
notification correspond to the end date of the yearly employment notification.
ID start end job reason for notification income in spell
1 17.08.2010 31.12.2010 training yearly notification 55000
1 01.01.2011 30.06.2011 training end of employment 58005
1 01.07.2011 31.12.2011 training yearly notification 183.16
1 01.01.2012 31.12.2012 training yearly notification 183.16
1 01.09.2013 31.12.2013 regular yearly notification 70
2 15.03.2011 31.12.2011 regular yearly notification 110
2 01.01.2012 31.07.2012 regular maternity leave 112
2 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 regular special payment 100
2 01.10.2013 31.12.2013 mini job yearly notification 13.34
2 01.11.2013 31.12.2013 mini job yearly notification 13.34
Table 2.1: Example of BeH data for two employees containing employment times, rea-
son for notification, and income. Data are organized in longitudinal format
including multiple spells for each employee.
2.1.2 LHG
The LHG data are a process-generated data of the FEA that contain start and end
dates of all periods in which unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II, UB II in
the remainder) is received. The data set is available on individual level even though
UB II is given at benefit community level (“Bedarfsgemeinschaft”). A benefit com-
munity consists of at least one person capable of work. Partners living in the same
household are also part of the benefit community, and unmarried children under 25
years living in the same household can also be included if they can not meet their
requirements through their own income or funds themselves. Children older than 25
constitute a separate benefit community even if they are living in the same house-
hold as their parents. In addition to the individual identification number that can be
merged to the social security number, every benefit community has an unique identi-
fication number in the LHG data set. Thus, every individual in the LHG data set can
be assigned to a benefit community.
Both, the BeH and LHG data sets are known to be very reliable (Jacobebbinghaus and
Seth, 2007) as they are are not only collected for statistical purposes but to calculate
pension claims and administer benefit claims and payments.
Many of the surveys that are conducted by the IAB are sampled from the admin-
istrative data of the FEA. This offers the great opportunity to link the survey data
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back to the administrative records to enrich survey responses by administrative data,
or to compare survey responses and administrative records. However, data linkage is
only allowed for respondents who explicitly agree to the linkage. More information
on asking for linkage consent, correlates of consent, and possible consent bias can be
found in Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012); Sakshaug et al. (2013); Sakshaug and Kreuter
(2014); Sakshaug et al. (2012).
In the following Chapters, the linkage of survey and administrative data is exploited
for assessing nonresponse bias and measurement error. The corresponding surveys
are described in the following Sections.
2.2 Panel Study Labour Market and Social Security
(Panel Arbeitsmarkt und Soziale Sicherung)
The panel “Labour Market and Social Security” (PASS) is an annual household panel
conducted by the IAB. Its aim is to study the individual and social effects of the Ger-
man “Hartz reforms” which came into effect in 2005 (see Trappmann et al., 2009).
These reforms introduced the unemployment benefit II at the community level. PASS
consists of two different samples to compare benefit recipients and non-recipients of
the new UB II. About half of the sample from the first wave is sampled from the reg-
ister of UB II recipients at the Federal Employment Agency. This is the recipient sample
because all households had received benefits by the date of sampling (July 2006). The
other half of the sample, called the population sample, is selected from a commercial
database of residential addresses. In this sample, people with low socio-economic
status are overrepresented. The first wave of data collection took place between De-
cember 2006 and July 2007. In every wave, refreshment households are sampled for
the recipient sample. These households include at least one benefit community that
received UB II in July of the respective year but did not receive UB II at any other
time since July 2006. To counter panel mortality, a new sample was drawn for both
subsamples before the fifth wave in 2011. The recipient refreshment sample consists
of households with benefit units who received UB II in July 2010 (Jesske and Schulz,
2012).
Each sampled household in the survey receives a household questionnaire which
is to be completed by the head of the household. Afterwards, each member of the
household who is aged at least 15 receives a personal questionnaire or a question-
naire for elderly people. The household questionnaire contains questions about the
household composition, dwelling, household income, and material deprivation, as
well as received unemployment benefits. The personal questionnaire contains ques-
tions about the individual’s employment status, employment history, and income.
The interviews for PASS are collected in sequential mixed-mode design (CATI and
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CAPI) whereas respondents can switch modes whenever they like. Interviews are
conducted in German, Russian and Turkish.
In the third wave, there has been an incentive experiment that is described and
analyzed in Chapter 3.
2.3 Work and Consumption in Germany (Arbeitsmarkt
und Verbraucherverhalten in Deutschland)
The survey “Work and Consumption in Germany” was fielded by the IAB and in part
funded by the LMU Munich. A gross sample of 24,236 eligible persons (aged 18 and
older) was drawn from the administrative data (IEB, Version V09.00, IAB Nürnberg
2011) in June 2011 according to three non-overlapping strata. All sample cases had at
least one security-contributing job in the last ten years. Cases from the first stratum
further received UB II in the last five years, cases from the second stratum received
unemployment insurance (UB I) in the last 10 years, and cases from the third stratum
did neither receive income support nor income insurance, but held jobs with two or
more different employers in the last 10 years.
Sample cases were randomly allocated to telephone or web mode: 12,400 cases were
assigned to the telephone survey, while 11,836 cases were assigned to the web survey.
Addresses for all sample cases were available on the sample frame. Additionally, for
some of the cases telephone numbers were available, but no email addresses.
The telephone and web parts of the “Work and Consumption” survey cover the
same topics while differing in some questions. Moreover, for both surveys the sample
cases were contacted by invitation letters that were kept as similar as possible. Both
surveys are explained in more detail in the next Paragraphs.
Telephone Survey (CATI) For 10,455 out of 12,400 cases, a telephone number was
available on the sample frame. During fieldwork, about eleven percent of the phone
numbers turned out to be invalid and could not be replaced by a working phone
number from the public directories, or were ineligible. Among those persons who
could be contacted (9,332), the target of 2,400 completed interviews could be met.
During fieldwork, at least 20 contact attempts were made per case, at varying points
in time such as weekdays and weekends, and different times of day. However, we
did not attempt specific refusal conversion once a case expressed some mild form
of refusal. Fieldwork was conducted in the months of August to October 2011. The
average survey completion time was 21 minutes.
Web Survey The web survey was constructed to be very similar to the CATI sur-
vey, but differed in some questions. Considering layout and functionality of the web
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telephone survey web survey
gross sample N 12,400 11,836
net sample (contactability) 9,332 10,525
completed interviews n 2,400 1,068
response rate (AAOPOR RR1) 19.35% 9.01%
cooperation rate (AAPOR CR1) 25.72% 10.15%
Table 2.2: Response rates across the CATI and web survey “Work and Consumption
in Germany”.
survey, we followed the guidelines for best practice given by Couper (2008). For
instance, we presented only one question per screen, only used drop-boxes where
applicable, and did not force the respondents to select an answer. The web survey
was programmed and hosted by the LINK institute. Invitation letters were sent out
including the URL of the web survey’s website as well as personal user names and
passwords. All sampled cases were also promised an incentive of e 3 in form of an
Amazon voucher for completing the interview. Respondents were asked to enter their
email address at the end of the interview so that they could be sent the voucher after
completion.
In total, we sent invitation letters to 11,836 sample cases, and 1,068 cases completed
the survey. Overall, 1,311 letters were returned to sender due to an incorrect address.
Thus, those respondents never received the invitation to participate. The response rate
of this survey was 9%1, the average completion time about 15 minutes. In order to re-
duce undercoverage and improve response rates, the invitation letters also offered the
opportunity to call a toll-free number to conduct a shortened version of the interview
on the telephone. Of the contacted cases, 312 people made use of the hotline. Out of
those calls, 161 called to schedule an appointment for a telephone interview, resulting
in an additional 132 interviews. The shortened telephone interviews are not part of
the following analyses. We embedded an incentive experiment in the web survey of
the “Work and Consumption in Germany” study that is described and analyzed in
chapter 4.
Table 2.2 summarizes the sample sizes, response, and cooperation rates according
to AAPOR standards (AAPOR, 2015) for both modes in the “Work and Consumption
in Germany” study. Even though the web survey respondents received an incentive
of e 3, the response rate is much higher in the CATI than in the web survey. Lower
response rates in web surveys, however, are usually found. Note that, while CATI
sample members are defined to be contactable once an interviewer established contact
to the respondent on the phone, we can only judge contactability of sample members
1There were 14 partial completions that will not be used for the following analyses. They are, however,
part of some other studies.
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of the web survey based on returning letters. Of course, it might be that letters were
not returned even though they did not reach the target person. Therefore, the net
sample size might be overestimated while the response rate is underestimated in the
web survey. Thus, response rates should be compared with caution.
Item nonresponse and measurement error in the income question are compared
between the two modes in Chapter 5.
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The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Nonre-
sponse Bias in a Household Panel
3.1 Introduction
It is well known that respondent incentives can increase response rates (James and
Bolstein, 1990; Willimack et al., 1995; Church, 1993; Singer, 2002; Singer and Ye, 2013;
Toepoel, 2012). It is also widely agreed that response rates per se are not a good
indicator of survey quality and that other measures, such as nonresponse bias, should
be taken into account (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008; Singer and Ye, 2013).
But much less clear is the effect of incentives on nonresponse bias. An increasing
response rate does not necessarily decrease nonresponse bias. However, if incentives
increase the response rates of some groups more than others, nonresponse bias is
likely to be affected. An increase in response rates only for subgroups who are likely
to participate anyway will increase nonresponse bias. Therefore, the desired effect
of incentives is to bring people who are less likely to respond into the respondent
pool. For example incentives that entice people with low socio-economic status or
low levels of education, and ethnic minorities, who are typically underrepresented in
surveys (Watson and Wooden, 2009) could be effective in reducing nonresponse bias.
Concerning the kind of incentive, literature shows that cash incentives increase
response rates more than in-kind incentives, unconditional incentives have a higher
effect than conditional ones and higher incentives increase response rates more than
lower ones (Church, 1993; Singer et al., 1999; Ryu et al., 2006; Singer and Ye, 2013).
The potential impact of incentives on underrepresented subgroups can be explained
by leverage saliency theory (Groves et al., 2000). Under this theory, the decision
to participate in a survey depends on various features of the survey, their relative
importance to the sample case, and how salient they are made to the sample case. If an
incentive is enough of a positive inducement to participate, overcoming the negative
and less enticing features of the survey, it may pull people into the respondent pool
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who would not otherwise participate. The subgroups most affected by a monetary
incentive are thought to be those for which money has a high importance.
Economic models of survey response stress that incentive payments may be per-
ceived as compensation for the time and effort a respondent provides (Philipson,
1997); such models predict that a modest incentive should have a stronger effect on
low income respondents (because their opportunity cost of time is lower).
Empirically, these predictions are broadly confirmed; for instance, Mack et al. (1998)
find that incentives of $20 can disproportionately increase participation of respon-
dents from poverty and Black households. Also Groves et al. (2006) find that people
who are less interested in surveys can be brought into the pool by monetary incentives
which serve as compensation for lack of interest. In a meta-analysis of incentive exper-
iments in face-to-face and telephone surveys Singer et al. (1999) find some evidence
that incentives can improve sample composition by increasing the response propen-
sity for people who are otherwise underrepresented, such as low income people or
non-whites. None of these studies examines the effects of incentives on nonresponse
bias of survey statistics directly.
In this Chapter, we analyze the effects of incentives on the nonresponse bias of
survey statistics using survey data from the German household panel PASS that was
specifically designed to study people with low socio-economic status (in particular,
welfare benefit recipients). In the third wave of this panel survey, an incentive ex-
periment was conducted in which households were randomly given either a prepaid
unconditional cash incentive or a post-paid conditional lottery ticket. The experimen-
tal groups differ by two characteristics of the incentives: conditional vs. unconditional
and cash vs. in-kind incentive. Although the effects can not be separated, they are
known to influence respondents in the same way (Church, 1993; Singer et al., 1999;
Singer and Ye, 2013).
Our question here is whether prepaid unconditional monetary incentives affect non-
response bias differently than a conditional post-paid lottery ticket. This is usually
untestable because no valid information on nonrespondents is available and therefore
a gold standard for comparison is missing. An important aspect of our study is that
we have administrative data on the target variables for both respondents and nonre-
spondents and we can compute nonresponse bias directly by comparing respondents
to the whole sample. We therefore address our research question first by comparing
nonresponse bias for the two experimental groups using administrative data.
For most surveys this direct approach can not be applied as usually no adminis-
trative data are available for both respondents and nonrespondents. In the absence
of such information, most studies have to rely on survey data on respondents to esti-
mate nonresponse bias. To study this particular problem, we will in a second analysis
approximate the nonresponse bias based on survey respondents, as proposed by Beth-
14
3.2 Data
lehem (1988). We will then compare both methods as to the conclusions they draw
about the effect of the two types of incentives on nonresponse bias. The analyses based
on the administrative data will thereby serve as a gold standard for this comparison.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Panel Data
For our analyses we use data from the first three waves of the German household
panel survey PASS (see Chapter 2). We analyze the recipient and population samples
jointly but use the sample indicator as a control in our statistical models when appro-
priate. Due to the overrepresentation of UB II recipients and low income people, we
are able to analyze the effect of the two types of incentives on these groups who are
often a small proportion of the sample in other surveys. Data are not weighted for
our analyses because survey weights can not be linked to the administrative data on
an individual level for all cases.
The incentive experiment was conducted in wave 3. In the first two waves, sample
units received a thank-you card containing a stamp worth 55 cents with their advance
letter, and responding households were given a German lottery ticket (“Aktion Men-
sch”, worth e 1.50 in the first, and “ARD-Fernsehlotterie” worth e 5 in the second
wave). In the experiment, panel households were randomly assigned to two treat-
ment groups: one group was promised a lottery ticket (lottery group), and the other
group was sent 10 Euros with their cover letter (cash group) (Büngeler et al., 2010).
Note that the experiment compares a conditional in-kind incentive to an uncondi-
tional cash incentive. Also, the monetary values of each are different.
In total, 16,091 households were part of the PASS wave 3 sample, including 4,031
wave 3 refreshment households who were not part of the incentive experiment. We
exclude 4,793 cases from our analyses who have only responded to one of the prior
waves and focus on 7,267 panel households who responded to both waves 1 and 2. Of
those, a randomly-selected 985 were part of another experiment and are omitted from
our analyses. For this Chapter we analyze the remaining 6,282 households, 2,952 of
which belong to the recipient sample and 3,330 to the population sample. Cases were
randomly assigned to the experimental groups within these two sub samples. In total,
3,163 cases were part of the conditional lottery ticket incentive group and 3,119 cases
were part of the conditional cash incentive group.
We are especially interested in the effect of incentives on estimates of personal
income, which we split into terciles for our analyses (low, middle and high income).
The income variable contains earnings from own employment only, i.e, social benefits
are not included. In addition, we examine socio-demographic variables that usually
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affect response, like gender, nationality (foreign or German), employment status, UB
II status, whether the person has a job of up to e 400 per month that is not taxed and
exempt from social insurance payments (“mini job”) and age. Age is split into five
categories: younger than 30, 30 – 39, 40 – 49, 50 – 59, and 60 or older.
3.2.2 Administrative Data
We use administrative data from the “Integrated Employment Biographies” (IEB) file
provided by the Research Data Center of the Federal Employment Agency to compute
the full sample’s true value (see Chapter 2.1). This data set contains detailed employ-
ment and benefit records for all sample units, respondents and nonrespondents to the
survey.
IEB data has been found to be very reliable concerning employment status, wages,
and transfer payments (Jacobebbinghaus and Seth, 2007).
We only make use of variables that are part of both the administrative data and
the survey data to be able to compare survey and administrative data findings. In
our analyses, we assume that the head-of-household who filled out the household
questionnaire is identical to the “head-of-household” according to the administrative
records (see Sakshaug and Kreuter, 2012).
Administrative data are available as spell data. These contain multiple observations
for each sample case which cover the beginning and the end of a span of time during
which the case is in a certain state, like employed, unemployed or benefit recipient.
The variables of interest are constructed from these data using reference dates. For
respondents, the date of the household interview is used. For all nonresponding cases
that were contacted in CATI, the date of the last contact was used. We do not have
contact data for cases contacted in CAPI, so we use the end of the field period as the
reference date for those cases.
3.2.3 Estimation Sample
In total, 5,179 of the 6,282 cases (82 %) who participated in waves one and two re-
sponded to the household interview in wave 3. For 5,063 of those, the head-of-
household completed his personal questionnaire as well. For all units within the
recipient sample, linkage to administrative data is straightforward as these data are
part of the sampling frame. In total, for only five cases from the recipient sample
administrative data could not be linked successfully. Most likely, these were wrong or
temporary entries in the frame at the date of sampling and deleted from the records
after the sample was drawn.
In contrast to the register-based recipient sample, cases from the population sample
need to be searched for in the administrative records. However, due to data protec-
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tion rules this is only allowed if linkage consent has been given beforehand. In the
population sample, 79.07 % of the respondents gave their consent for data linkage,
and 77.93 % of them could be found in the records using probabilistic record linkage
procedures. Thus, 62 % of the population sample cases could be linked successfully
(see Table 3.1).
recipient sample
n = 2,952
population sample
n = 3,330
available for linkage 100.00 % 079.07 %
part of the analyses 099.83 % 061.53 %
Table 3.1: Estimation sample for administrative data analyses.
Since the administrative data only contain information of individuals who received
any kind of unemployment benefit, were registered as unemployed, or were employ-
ees subject to social insurance contributions, the cases which could not be linked are
likely to be self-employed or civil servants. Given the analyses from Sakshaug and
Kreuter (2012), we do not expect much consent bias in these data. In their analyses of
the same survey, consent bias is only found for age and foreign citizenship, and it is
very small compared to other bias sources, such as bias due to measurement error or
nonresponse. Also, Beste (2011) finds that only respondents having a foreign citizen-
ship and respondents who receive no income at all might be underrepresented in the
linked data set. We do not expect that excluding respondents who could not be linked
to the administrative data or did not agree to the linkage introduces significant biases
into our analyses. For our analyses using the administrative data, we use the 2,947
cases of the recipient sample and the 2,049 cases of the population sample that were
successfully linked to the administrative data — which makes 4,996 cases in total.
In order to apply the survey and the administrative data analysis methods to com-
parable estimation samples, cases that had to be excluded from the administrative
data analysis because they could not be linked were excluded from the analysis using
the survey data only. We checked this restriction and found that survey data findings
do not change substantially when including the previously omitted cases. In addi-
tion, varying degrees of item nonresponse to the survey variables of interest resulted
in differing numbers of cases available for the analyses (see Table 3.2).
3.3 Methods
For our bias analyses we use two different methods. First, we compute nonresponse
bias directly using administrative data for respondents and nonrespondents of the
survey as a gold standard. Since most surveys can not be linked to administrative
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variable survey data administrative data
income 1669 2401
age 3995 4996
UB II 4078 4996
female 3995 4996
foreign 3993 4996
mini job 3995 4996
employed 3995 4996
Table 3.2: Cases used for the analyses
data, this method usually can not be used. We provide the nonresponse bias approx-
imation proposed by Bethlehem (1988) as a complementary second method that will
be compared to the gold standard.
In general, the bias of a statistic is given as the difference of the statistic’s expectation
and the true population value. Thus, the bias in the mean statistic of a random
variable Y, using observations y, is given by:
bias(ȳ) = E(ȳ)− Ȳ (3.1)
This bias can result from many sources (e.g., undercoverage or overcoverage, mea-
surement error, nonresponse). The estimation of nonresponse bias in the administra-
tive data is straightforward as information is available for all sample cases and other
error sources can be neglected. Using administrative data, nonresponse bias is given
as the difference of the estimated mean using the respondents only and the estimated
mean of all sample cases:
b̂ias(ȳadmin) = ˆ̄yadmin,respondents − ˆ̄yadmin,sample (3.2)
In order to be able to compare nonresponse bias statistics across variables, we use
a measure of relative bias which equals the estimated bias standardized by the full
sample mean of the respective variable.
r̂el.bias(ȳadmin) =
b̂ias(ȳadmin)
ˆ̄yadmin,sample
∗ 100 (3.3)
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When no administrative data are available, nonresponse bias can be approximated
using survey data only. As Bethlehem (1988) shows, nonresponse bias in the mean
statistic of y, based on survey respondents only, can be approximated by
bias(ȳ) ≈ cov(y, ρ)
ρ̄
(3.4)
with ρ̄ being the mean response propensity of the (sub)population and
cov(y, ρ) being the covariance of the response propensity and survey variable y. The
formula shows that for a given covariance an increasing mean response propensity
always has a decreasing impact on nonresponse bias. Also, a decreasing variance
in response propensity leads to decreasing bias even if the covariance of response
propensity and survey variable stays the same (see Peytchev et al., 2010). The esti-
mated nonresponse bias for wave 3 using the survey method is then calculated as
b̂ias(ȳsurvey) ≈
ĉov(yrespondents wave3, ρ̂wave3)
¯̂ρwave3
(3.5)
where ρ̂wave3 is the estimated wave 3 response propensity and
ĉov(yrespondents wave3, ρ̂wave3) is the estimated covariance of the wave 3 survey response
and the estimated wave 3 response propensity. Since we are using panel data, sur-
vey data from previous waves can be used to estimate wave 3 response propensi-
ties (ρ̂wave3) for all sample units. Therefore, based on information from waves 1 and
2, wave 3 response (yes/no) is modeled dependent on treatment group and socio-
demographic variables. We estimate the response propensities using logistic regres-
sion models. The covariates on the household level are all collected in wave two:
household size, presence of children under four in the household, house ownership,
UB II recipiency, whether the household lives in eastern or western Germany and
adjusted household equivalence income. The household income is adjusted by the
(old) OECD equivalence scale which weights the household income by the number of
household members and their age. This specific scale assigns a value of 1 to the first
household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child.
We use indicators for whether the head of household gave a personal interview
and whether all household members gave personal interviews in the second wave.
The model includes the number of missing values in the second wave for the set of
variables everyone received. We additionally include personal characteristics of the
respondent. These are age, gender, an indicator whether someone was born outside
Germany, the weekly hours worked, marital status and education. For all variables,
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the most recent information available is used. We fill in missing age, gender, education
and marital status from the first wave if available. Also, for people who did not fill out
a personal questionnaire in the second wave at all we use the personal information
collected in the first wave (180 cases). The model includes an indicator for recipient or
population sample, whether the household in wave 3 was first approached by CATI
or CAPI and whether the mode needed to be switched during the fieldwork. Finally,
we include a dummy for the incentive treatment and interactions of the treatment
with all other covariates. Of particular interest are interactions of incentives and
variables that indicate social status, like unemployment benefit, household income,
and the deprivation index, as these interactions reveal different impacts of incentives
on different socio-economic groups.
There is a small amount of missing data in key variables that we impute for adjusted
household income (28 cases missing), UB II recipient (13 cases missing), age (14 cases
missing) and working hours in the last job (13 cases missing). The imputation model
uses the same variables on household and personal level as the propensity models to
make sure that it reflects the relations of these variables correctly. We perform multi-
ple imputation using chained equations (m = 10). Chained equations run imputation
models for each variable containing missing data conditional on the covariates of the
imputation model and all other variables containing missing data. This approach is
used because the imputed variables are of different type (continuous, categorical) and
no joint density can be specified to perform imputation by joint modeling (Azur et al.,
2011).
We predict the response propensity by first estimating a person’s contact propensity
and then estimating the probability of response, given contact. The response propen-
sity is the product of these two propensities. We use a two stage estimation strategy to
account for the sequential nature of the response process and to allow the covariates
to have differential effects on contact and nonresponse (see Bethlehem et al. (2011)).
The average pseudo R2 over the 10 imputations is 0.1809 (min=0.1807; max=0.1813)
modeling contact and 0.2494 (min= 0.2491; max= 0.2496) modeling response given
contact.
For this second method, we also use the estimated relative bias to compare the
conclusions drawn by both methods. As we do not have the wave 3 information for
nonrespondents, we have to use the wave 2 survey mean of the full sample. The
relative nonresponse bias using the survey method is then given by
r̂el.bias(ȳsurvey) ≈
b̂ias(ȳsurvey)
ˆ̄yrespondents wave2
∗ 100 (3.6)
Thus, for the survey method, the standardization term has to be lagged by one year
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as compared to the standardization for the administrative data method. Depending
on the time-varying nature of each considered variable, this is of course an approxi-
mation. However, the entire survey method is approximate and in most instances the
only way to analyze nonresponse bias. Therefore we find it particularly interesting
to compare the conclusions drawn by both methods, using the administrative data
as the gold standard. To this we turn now. Firstly, based on estimates derived as
stated in equation (3) we will compare the relative biases between the lottery and the
cash group. Secondly, we will apply equation (6) to the survey data in order to see
whether this method comes to similar conclusions as the administrative data method.
Confidence intervals are computed using bootstrap, and 10,000 bootstrap replicates
are computed for each relative bias estimation. The bootstrap 0.025 % and 0.975 %
empirical quantiles serve as the 95 % confidence intervals.
3.4 Results
We find that the response rate is higher for the unconditional cash group (85.54 %)
than for the conditional lottery group (79.39 %), and the difference is statistically
significant (p < 0.001). Concerning response rates, we can see that in this experiment
incentives work in the expected direction. However, as an increasing response rate
does not ensure a decrease in nonresponse bias, we will next analyze the variable
specific relative nonresponse bias for personal income and several socio-demographic
variables.
Administrative Data Findings
Figure 3.1 shows the relative nonresponse bias (including 95 % confidence intervals)
in income estimation for the two incentive groups using administrative data (for num-
bers see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Whereas there is no significant relative nonresponse
bias for any income category in the cash group, there is significant relative nonre-
sponse bias for the lowest and highest income category in the lottery group. For
the lottery group, the proportion of people in the high income group is significantly
overestimated and the proportion of people in the low income group is significantly
underestimated. Even though the relative nonresponse bias is significantly different
from zero for these two income categories in the lottery group, the lottery and the cash
group do not significantly differ from one another for any of the income categories.
Figure 3.2 shows the relative nonresponse bias in the estimation of the proportions
of people falling into the five age categories using administrative data. In trend, the
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Figure 3.1: Relative nonresponse bias in income estimation using administrative data
including 95% bootstrap intervals.
older age groups are overrepresented while the younger age groups are underrep-
resented. We find significant relative nonresponse bias for the lowest and second
highest age group for both experimental groups. The relative nonresponse bias for
the oldest age group is only significantly different from zero for the lottery group.
Also, relative nonresponse bias in the extreme age groups is less for the cash group
than for the lottery group. Summarizing, we can state that there is less relative non-
response bias on age measures for the cash than for the lottery group, even though
differences between the groups are not significant for any age group.
Figure 3.3 shows relative nonresponse bias for some socio-demographic variables.
As for income and age, none of the variables show significant differences between
the two incentive groups. Also, relative nonresponse bias is in the same direction for
both experimental groups, except for the proportion of females. People who are born
outside Germany are only significantly underrepresented in the cash group whereas
relative nonresponse bias in the lottery group is not significantly different from zero.
There is no significant relative nonresponse bias for the proportion of people having
a “mini job” and the proportion of people being employed. Even though relative
nonresponse bias for the proportion of females is in different directions for both ex-
perimental groups, it is not significantly different from zero for either group. The
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Figure 3.2: Relative nonresponse bias in age estimation using administrative data in-
cluding 95% bootstrap intervals.
proportion of people receiving UB II does not show any significant relative nonre-
sponse bias.
We combined the population and recipient samples for our analyses because we
were interested in nonresponse bias for the whole study. However, when we looked
at the two subsamples separately, we found that the relative bias for income and UB
II was smaller in the more homogenous sample of recipients than in the population
sample. Also, it was not significantly different from zero.
Survey Data Findings
The relative nonresponse bias in the income estimation shows very similar patterns
across the income groups for the survey data approximation (see Figure 3.4) as for
the administrative data method (see also Table B.2 in Appendix B). That is, we find
no significant relative nonresponse bias in income estimation for the cash group and
no significant differences between the experimental groups. For the lottery group
however, the survey method fails to detect significant relative nonresponse bias for
the highest income group.
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Figure 3.3: Relative nonresponse bias in estimation for socio-demographic variables
using administrative data including 95% bootstrap intervals.
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Figure 3.4: Relative nonresponse bias in income estimation using survey data includ-
ing 95% bootstrap intervals.
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Figure 3.5: Relative nonresponse bias in age estimation using survey data including
95% bootstrap intervals.
Figure 3.5 shows the relative nonresponse bias in the estimation of people falling
into the five age categories using survey data. Again, the survey data method shows
very similar relationships as the administrative data method: the older age categories
are overestimated and the younger categories are underestimated. The relative nonre-
sponse bias is statistically significant for the youngest and second oldest age category.
Also, the relative nonresponse bias in the oldest age category is found to be signifi-
cantly different from zero for the lottery group. However, the survey method wrongly
finds significant nonresponse bias for the oldest age category within the cash group.
This difference to the administrative data analysis might be explained by the findings
of Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012) who find a small consent bias for age. Again, we do
not find any significant differences between the experimental groups.
The estimates of relative nonresponse bias in socio-demographic variables (Figure
3.6) show a similar pattern as the administrative data estimates. Again, none of
the variables shows significant differences in nonresponse bias between the incentive
groups. However, the survey method wrongly finds a significant overrepresentation
of employed respondents and significant underrepresentation of UBII recipients in
the cash group. Also, the survey method wrongly indicates a significant underrepre-
sentation of females for the lottery group.
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Figure 3.6: Relative nonresponse bias in estimation for socio-demographic variables
using survey data including 95% bootstrap intervals.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
We find that — compared to the conditional post-paid lottery group — unconditional
prepaid cash incentives reduce the relative nonresponse bias for income. This re-
duction, however, is not significant as the confidence intervals for the relative bias
estimates are overlapping. Also, there is no significant bias in income measures for
the cash group. Finally, unconditional prepaid cash incentives reduce nonresponse
bias in estimates of the age distribution and of the proportion of people having a
“mini job”, which are both related to income.
Although our analysis focuses on the aggregate survey outcome and we do not
know how incentives work at the individual level, we think that these findings could
be explained by leverage-saliency and economic theory. According to leverage-saliency
theory the impact of cash incentives should be highest for people who are missing
other motivation to participate in the survey and for whom money has the highest
importance. Therefore, it might be that low income people are over-proportionately
attracted by the cash incentive. Also, low income people have lower opportunity cost
for survey participation and according to economic theory, a modest incentive of e 10
will be more attractive to them as compared to people with a higher opportunity cost
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of time.
Our empirical approach has some limitations. The panel survey in which the incen-
tive experiment was implemented overrepresents low income people.
Also, we were only able to link sample cases to the administrative data that gave
consent. Since consent bias is usually found to be very small and cases were randomly
assigned to the experimental groups, differences between the groups are not expected
to be affected by consent bias. Furthermore, the attrition bias we analyzed in this
Chapter might be different from nonresponse bias in the first wave of a panel or in a
cross sectional survey. Also, the experiment alters two characteristics of the incentive
that can not be separated.
Regarding our assessment of how well nonresponse bias can be characterized using
survey data alone (the “survey method”), we find this to be a useful tool for analyz-
ing nonresponse bias when no administrative data can serve as a gold standard. The
bias estimates using the survey method broadly reflect the patterns of relative nonre-
sponse bias using the administrative data but seem to fail to give correct confidence
intervals for some variables. One possible explanation for the differences between
the two methods could be measurement error in the survey variables. Since the sur-
vey approximation necessarily has to rely on the estimation of propensity models,
differences could also be due to limitations of these models.
Our findings confirm that the unconditional cash incentive increases the response
rate compared to the conditional lottery ticket. But what is more important, it de-
creases nonresponse bias in the key variables of the survey at the same time. Cash
incentives have proved useful to decrease nonresponse bias in this low income and
benefit-related survey. Future research should investigate whether this finding gener-
alizes to other surveys and target populations.
Turning to the implications of our findings, we recognize that our finding that
monetary incentives are especially effective for low income people might raise ethical
concerns (Grant, 2002). According to the Helsinki Declaration, incentives would be
called ethically problematic if they are coercive or if they give undue inducement to
respond to surveys. While it is widely agreed that incentives can never be coercive
(Wertheimer and Miller, 2008; Grady, 2001) since they are an offer to the respondent
and not a threat, some scientists worry that incentives might be an undue inducement
to respond. This would be so if they lead to respondents participating against their
will and “against their better judgment” (Grant and Sugarman, 2004). Since incen-
tives and other forms of payment are always used to induce people to do something
they would not do otherwise, ethical problems might arise if incentives are used to
induce people to do something they are verse to. One could argue that is the case
if the offer is so attractive that respondents are not able to refuse and they decide
to participate even though that means they have to take risks that they would not
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be willing to take otherwise. One might, however, argue that the incentive compen-
sates an individual for her willingness to take certain risks, and that ethical concerns
should be implemented using absolute standards that rule out a risk entirely if it is
deemed unethical. In any event, studies in survey research do not provide evidence
supporting the notion that higher incentives lead to acceptance of higher risks: In an
experimental setting, Singer and Couper (2008) find that monetary incentives raise the
willingness to participate to hypothetical surveys, and that willingness declines with
risk of disclosure of sensitive data. But they do not detect a significant interaction
between the amount of the incentive and the risk of disclosure. Similar relationships
are found for two studies that explore incentives in the context of clinical studies.
Halpern et al. (2004) find that people’s willingness to participate in a hypothetical
clinical trial increases as the payment level rises and as the risk of adverse effects or
the risk of being assigned to the control groups decreases. They find no significant
interaction between the risk people are willing to take and the incentive level. Bent-
ley and Thacker (2004) also find that willingness to participate in studies is higher if
incentives are higher and decreases with greater risk. They also do not find any in-
teraction of incentive level and risk on the willingness to respond. They also find that
a respondent’s rating of the study risk does not depend on the amount of incentives.
Although the harm of disclosure of confident information in social surveys may not
be comparable to the risks in clinical studies, and the incentives in survey are small
compared to those given in clinical studies, the rationale is the same for both kinds
of studies, and incentives in social surveys are discussed along these lines by ethic
boards.
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The Influence of Within-Survey Incentives on
Response Quality in a Web Survey
4.1 Introduction
Even though a sampled person may agree to participate in a survey, she may not
provide answers to all of the questions asked or give wrong or imprecise answers,
resulting in item nonresponse and measurement error. Particularly in web surveys,
where no interviewer is present, the prevalence of satisficing responses like “no an-
swer” and “don’t know” can result in a significant proportion of missing data. Also,
satisficing strategies (Krosnick, 1991) might lead to coarse, e.g., rounded or heaped
data. Since all these forms of “bad” survey answers can bias survey outcomes strongly,
researchers aim at reducing satisficing behavior.
Cannell et al. (1981) found that a request to think hard about the next question and
to try to be as precise as possible can significantly increase data quality of personal in-
terviews: people receiving such a request report more items in open-ended questions,
give more precise answers (compared to medical records), and do more often check
outside sources. These findings also hold for telephone interviews, even though the
effects are in general smaller for the phone than for the personal mode (Miller and
Cannell, 1982). Also, one recent study by Smyth et al. (2009) found that extra in-
structions can increase both the number of topics provided in answers to open-ended
questions and response times but at the same time increase item nonresponse in a
web survey. Overall, there is evidence that special verbal instructions informing re-
spondents about the importance of correct answers and asking them to think hard
can increase data quality in terms of response times, validity, and length of answers
to open-ended questions. However, it is not clear whether other forms of “bad” an-
swers can be decreased as well. Also, it is not clear whether the positive effect of the
instruction can be increased even further by adding some monetary incentive to it.
There are basically two conflicting theories about the effect of incentives on re-
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sponse quality: Self-perception theory (Hansen, 1980) suggests a decrease in response
quality. This is, respondents who are offered an external incentive will not be able to
develop intrinsic motivation and therefore will be likely to choose satisficing strate-
gies. According to this theory, even respondents who are generally willing to provide
good answers can lose their intrinsic motivation, and the quality of their responses
might decrease. The opposite effect is expected by leverage-saliency theory (Groves
et al., 2000). Incentives can increase motivation or compensate for missing motivation
and lead to increasing effort and thus to better data quality. It can also be argued that
receiving an incentive creates an obligation to reciprocate by giving good answers
(Gouldner, 1960).
There is only few literature about the effect of incentives on response quality, and
it is only concerned with initial incentives that are given to increase survey partic-
ipation (Singer and Ye, 2013). Also, it typically focuses on item nonresponse and
length of answers to open-ended questions as indicators of data quality only. The
findings are ambiguous. Curtin et al. (2007) for example find no effects of incentives
on data quality, whereas Jäckle and Lynn (2008) find that prepaid incentives increase
item nonresponse. The latter still find a net information gain by incentives due to
decreasing unit nonresponse. Medway (2012) looks at the effects of several different
incentives on many different indicators of survey quality, such as item nonresponse,
straight-lining, rounding, interview length and response accuracy, and also finds ba-
sically no differences between incentive treatments. However, none of these studies
analyzes incentives that are specifically given to increase response quality. That is,
initial incentives might not have an effect in addition to increased participation (Med-
way, 2012). This might be the case because the respondent feels that she already
fulfilled her duty by responding, or because she no longer thinks about the incentive
after the interview has started.
Most studies of response quality are not able to distinguish between sample selec-
tion and survey quality: respondents who are brought into the survey by an incentive
might be different from people participating without an incentive, and differences
in response behavior and response distributions between incentive treatments might
be due to different sample compositions instead of different reporting behavior. To
the best of our knowledge, there has never been the attempt to combine the request
to think hard about the next questions with additional incentives given during the
interview.
In the web survey “Work and Consumption in Germany”, we conduct an experi-
ment to study the effects of instructions to think hard together with incremental in-
centives on response quality. We assess the response quality using different measures.
In the first part we look at the time spent answering the question as an indicator of
the effort being made to provide good answers. In the second part, we investigate
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item nonresponse (“don’t know” and “no answers”), and in the third part, we ana-
lyze rounding and heaping in one recall question and two questions about subjective
expectation (on a 0%-100% scale). In the fourth part, we are able to validate the an-
swers to four questions: one knowledge question for which the right answer is known
and the same for everybody, and three recall questions that we are able to validate
by linking survey answers to administrative records. With our experiment we seek to
answer the following research questions:
Do respondents who receive the request to think hard give better answers?
Does giving additional incentives increase data quality even further?
Are effects stronger when the additional incentive is higher?
4.2 Incentive Experiment
As explained in Chapter 2.3, all sample cases of the web survey of the “Work and
Consumption in Germany” study were promised an incentive of e 3 for completing
the interview in form of an Amazon voucher. Even though for personal interviews
unconditional cash incentives have been found to increase response rates more than
other kinds of incentives (Singer and Ye, 2013), they are less common in web surveys
(Göritz, 2006, 2008) as they are usually harder to realize. For instance, no postal ad-
dresses of sample cases are known where the cash money could be sent to. Although
in our case it would have been possible to send unconditional cash incentives, we
decided to use the more cost-efficient conditional incentives. Moreover, Göritz (2004)
does not find differences in data quality for different kinds of initial incentives in on-
line access panels. The user names and passwords allow to identify the respondents
and link the survey data to the administrative records. The register data combine
information from various sources on employees and basic income support recipients
(“Unemployment Benefit II”, short UB II) in Germany (see Chapter 2.1). Due to Ger-
man data protection laws, linking survey and administrative data is only possible for
respondents who explicitly consent to data linkage (62.28 % in our survey).
The incentive experiment was placed towards the end of the interview, right before
the socio-demographic section. For the experiment, respondents were randomly as-
signed to eleven treatment groups. Ten experimental groups were requested to take
their time and think hard about the answers to the next questions, and to be as pre-
cise as possible. Of these ten groups, nine were further told that — as a thank-you in
advance — an additional incentive was now added to the Amazon voucher that the
were already promised to receive for completing the interview (see Chapter 2.3). This
additional incentive was assigned randomly and ranged from e 0.50 to e 4.50. In this
experiment, there are two control groups: one group received the request to think
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hard but no incentive, and the other did neither receive a request nor an incentive.
This setting allows us to differentiate between the effect of the additional incentive
and the effect of the request for extra effort.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the treatment groups of the incentive experiment.
Note that we exclude three respondents from our analyses because they obviously
went back and forth in the interview and we were not able to keep track of that. We
further exclude two cases who reported unreasonable years of birth (1900 and 9999)
leaving us with 1063 cases for our analyses. The random assignment was performed
treatment
x
request
to think hard
amount of
additional incentive n
no incentive, no request no e 0 116
request only yes e 0 106
3 yes e 0.50 98
4 yes e 1.00 92
5 yes e 1.50 106
6 yes e 2.00 87
7 yes e 2.50 87
8 yes e 3.00 110
9 yes e 3.50 87
10 yes e 4.00 87
11 yes e 4.50 87
Table 4.1: Treatment groups included in our incentive experiment, the sample size is
n = 1063.
right before the experiment started, and was independent of other experimental con-
ditions. Also, we do not find any evidence that socio-demographic groups are not ran-
domly represented in the experimental groups. Only the three strata are not equally
distributed across the groups, and are therefore controlled for in the multivariate
analyses. In total, 33 respondents broke off the interview after the experimental inter-
vention started, and we do not find significant differences in break-off rates between
treatment groups. Break-offs are in generally not part of our analyses.
The questions after the experimental intervention are taken from ongoing panel
studies. That is, they have all been fielded and well tested, and we know that they are
usually subject to item nonresponse and measurement error. We only chose questions
for which we know which response patterns to expect, and for which we think that
response quality can be increased by thinking hard enough about the answer.
The questions contain knowledge questions, recall questions referring to different
time periods, sensitive questions, and questions about subjective expectations. Ques-
tions require either yes/no or numerical responses. The questions were divided into
two blocks, “standard of living” and “health”, of four questions each. The order of
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question wording answer type abbreviation
“What do you think is the
recommended daily number of
calories for an average adult of
your sex?”
numeric calories
“How many times did you visit
a doctor in 2011?”
numeric doctor visits
“Have you ever been told by a
doctor to have one of the fol-
lowing diseases?”
17 diseases listed from least to
most common ; yes/no for each
disease
diseases
“How likely do you think it is
that you will live until age x?”
(x depending on a persons age)
numeric (0%-100%) life expectancy
Table 4.2: Questions within the health block of the web survey.
the blocks was randomized, but not the order of the questions within the block. The
questions and answer types are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
In addition to the survey responses, we have time stamps for every question con-
taining the date and time (to the precision of seconds) when the response was logged
in. Our first question is whether there is a relationship between the additional incen-
tives and the time the respondents spent on a question.
For all questions in the experimental block, we are first interested in the proportion
of “don’t know” and “no answer” responses. Item nonresponse is a big problem in
all surveys as it can lead to biased estimates and a loss of precision (Rubin, 1976).
In a second step, we are analyzing different forms of satisfising answers. Tables 4.4
and 4.5 give an overview of the satisfising behavior that is investigated for each of
the questions. First, we are interested in the amount of rounding and heaping (round-
ing to prominent values) which also leads to biased estimates (Heitjan and Rubin,
1991). It is specifically problematic if the choice of the rounding interval is unknown
and not random (Heitjan and Rubin, 1991). A special case which is very common in
expectation questions, is rounding to 50%. There is some evidence that responding
“50%” is very likely to be non-informative and can be viewed as an alternative way
of saying “I don’t know” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2002, 2000; Manski and Molinari,
2010). Respondents who are very unsure about the true answer might prefer to say“
50%” just to fulfill the requirement of giving a numeric answer, but without having
to commit themselves to a specific answer. In this sense, Gouret (2011) finds that 50%
answers are mostly uninformative, and that this is the most often stated uninforma-
tive answer in expectation questions. For the recall questions that require a numeric
response, heaping patterns are investigated according to patterns usually found for
these same questions in different surveys. We study the extent of rounding monthly
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question wording answer type abbreviation
“What was your last monthly
income?”
numeric income
“Did your household re-
ceive unemployment benefit
(UB II) during the last 12
months?”
yes/no UB II
“Please think of all employ-
ments in your life: how long
was your longest period of
employment you had with-
out being unemployed in be-
tween?
How many years numeric employment years
and months have you been
employed in that period?”
numeric employment month
“How likely do you think it
is that your living standard
will decrease in the next five
years?”
numeric (0%-100%) standard of living
Table 4.3: Questions within the finance block of the web survey.
income to multiple of e 500. This pattern is frequently observed, for example in the
PASS survey from which we took the income question. The doctor visits questions is
similarly asked for in the German part of the SHARE survey, where strong heaps at
52, 24, 12, 6, 4, 2 are found. This corresponds to the answer heuristics “once a week”,
“two times a month”, “once a month”, “every other month”, “every quarter year”,
and “every half year”. Note that for the survey questions — with the exception of
income and longest employment phase — we do not know a person’s true answer. A
rounded or heaped response is not necessarily wrong for a single person, and it only
hints at a satisficing answer. Moreover, a value that is not rounded is not necessarily
true. On aggregate, however, we assume that the decline in the proportion of rounded
responses for a certain treatment group implies an increase in data quality. We also
look at measurement error directly for some validation questions which can cause se-
vere bias (Cochran, 1968) if it is non-random. For income and longest employment
phase, we are able to control for the fact that seemingly rounded or heaped values can
still represent a person’s true answer. This is a quite unique situation, and the valida-
tion findings can be compared with findings using only indirect measures, which in
most applications is the only way to assess response quality. Measurement error can
be due to either reporting a wrong value on purpose (e.g. due to social desirability
or data protection concerns), or to the respondents’ incapability to provide the true
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question type question research question
sensitive recall question
referring to last months
income rounding to multiples of
500, difference of survey
and register data
sensitive recall question
referring to the last 12
month
UB II difference of survey and
register data
recall question employment
year/employment month
rounding to multiples of 5
for employment year, dif-
ference of survey and reg-
ister data
subjective expectation
question
living standard heaping to 50%
Table 4.4: Questions within the health block and research questions connected to
them.
question type question research question
general knowledge ques-
tion
calories right answers (2000 kcal
for everyone)
recall question referring
to 2011
doctor visits heaping to 52, 24, 12, 6, 4,
2
recall question diseases amount of yes-answers to
most common diseases
subjective expectation
question
life expectancy heaping to 50%
Table 4.5: Questions within the finance block and research questions connected to
them.
value (e.g. due to recall problems).
In the following, we subsume all kinds of undesirable answers — item nonresponse,
rounding, heaping, and direct measures of measurement error — under the umbrella
term “unsatisfactory response”.
4.3 Results
We assess our research questions by comparing the incentive groups for several indi-
cators of survey quality: First, the experimental groups are compared with respect to
the time to answer each question. Second, the amount of item nonresponse (“don’t
know” and “no answer”) in each question is compared. The third part contains a com-
parison of rounded answers between the groups. To this end, indicators for rounding
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Figure 4.1: Frequency of answers to calories question.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 22 25 30 35 40 48 52 60 10
0
D
N
N
A
Doctor Visits
Number of Doctor Visits
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Figure 4.2: Frequency of answers to doctor visits question.
and heaping (yes/no) according to Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are built, and the answers for
the calories, UB II, and employment questions are validated. Finally, we assess all
questions of the experiment jointly.
4.3.1 General Findings
Before analyzing the incentive experiment, we provide some descriptives of the survey
response distributions for the experimental questions. Overall, the expected response
patterns can be observed for our survey. Figures 4.1 to 4.9 show the responses to
the eight questions of the incentive experiment. For the calories question, we find a
strong peak at the right answer (2000 calories, Figure 4.1). The distribution for the
doctor visits (Figure 4.2) is not quite as expected. We see heaps at 2, 8, 10, 12, 15 and
20 but were expecting heaps at 52, 24, 12, 6, 4 and 2. In our survey, 52 and 24 are not
chosen at all. There is a heap for the life expectancy question (Figure 4.4) at 50%, but
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Figure 4.3: Frequency of answers to diseases question.
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Figure 4.4: Frequency of answers to live expectancy question.
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Figure 4.12: Time spent on all questions of the experiment.
there are stronger heaps at 80%, 90% and 100%. We find a much stronger heap at 50%
for the living standard question than for the live expectancy question (Figure 4.9), but
living standard shows a stronger heap at 0% than at 50%. For income (Figure 4.5),
the expected heaps at multiples of e 500 are found, but there is also a strong heap at
e 400, which corresponds to the standard income from a mini job. At the same time,
e 400 could be a rounded version of income from UB II, which actually was explicitely
not asked for. We find heaping to multiples of 5 years for the employment question
(Figure 4.7).
From Figure 4.10, we see that item nonresponse in the experimental blocks is quite
low: most respondents show no or only one missing value in this part of the ques-
tionnaire. Combining missing and rounded/heaped/incorrect answers (Figure 4.11),
we find that most people give two of these unsatisfactory answers. The median time
spent on the eight questions (Figure 4.12) is 223 seconds but there are strong outliers.
Probably these respondents took a break during the interview resulting in a block
length of up to about 48 minutes. Because of these strong outliers, we assess at the
median instead of means times spent on each question.
The comparison of the questions, irrespective of incentive groups, shows that item
nonresponse and time to answer varies considerably across the questions (see Table
4.6).
Item nonresponse is found to highest for the variable employment month, while the
amount of item nonresponse for employment year is much lower. These two questions
were on the same page, and it was possible to go on in the questionnaire without re-
ceiving an error message if only the year of employment was filled in. The answer to
employment month was then automatically set to “no answer”. Because of the immense
number of missing information in employment month, we exclude it from further anal-
yses. As known from the literature, there is a lot of missing information for income,
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question % item nr % don’t know % no answer time to answer
knowledge
calories 24 21 03 14
recall
doctor visits 12 06 06 19
employment year 11 04 07 49
employment month 49 05 44 49
diseases 07 01 06 25
sensitive
income 22 04 18 28
UB II 03 01 02 09
expectation
standard of living 14 10 05 27
life expectancy 13 08 05 20
Table 4.6: Proportions of item nonresponse, “don’t knows” and “no answers” and
median time to answer for the variables of the incentive experiment.
mostly due to “no answer”. In general, we find more “no answer” than “don’t know”
responses for sensitive questions, i.e., income, UB II, doctor visits, and more “don’t
know” responses for knowledge and expectation questions. For our analyses, it is not
important why the information is missing, and we do not differentiate between “don’t
know” and “no answer”. Instead, we only look at item nonresponse as a whole.
For all respondents who gave substantive answers, i.e., excluding “don’t know” and
“no answer”, we find the following for our indicators of unsatisfactory answers:
• 65% of the respondents give a wrong answer to the calories question.
• 38% of the respondents round to prominent values in the doctor visits question.
• 66% of the respondents do not report at least one of the last three diseases.
• 8% of the respondents choose “50%” in the life expectancy question.
• 24% of the respondents round their income to multiples of e 500, 69% to multi-
ples of e 100.
• 6% of the consenting respondents misreport their UBII status.
• 22% of the respondents round the years of employment to multiples of 5.
• 16% of the respondents choose “50%” in the living standard question.
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Figure 4.13: Time spent on the calorie question.
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Figure 4.14: Time spent on the doctor visits question.
4.3.2 Bivariate Findings
Next we compare time spent on each question, the amount of item nonresponse, and
unsatisfactory answers across the 11 incentive groups. In our experimental setting,
we randomly assigned respondents to the treatments groups. Thus, comparing group
means will give us a first indication on the effect of incentives on measurement error.
In a next step, we use multivariate models to analyze the incentive experiment. By
doing this, we can include both indicators of the respondents’ behavior prior to the ex-
periment and interactions with the incentive treatment. Finally, we will test different
functional forms of the effect of additional incentives on unsatisfactory responses.
Time Spent on a Question
Figures 4.13 to 4.20 show the boxplots of response times for each of the eight questions
of the incentive experiment, depending on the incentive treatment. Distributions of
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Figure 4.15: Time spent on the disease question.
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Figure 4.16: Time spent on the life expectancy question.
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Figure 4.17: Time spent on the income question.
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Figure 4.18: Time spent on the UB II question.
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Figure 4.19: Time spent on the employment question.
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Figure 4.20: Time spent on the standard of living question.
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Figure 4.21: Item nonresponse in the calories question.
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Figure 4.22: Item nonresponse in the doctor visits question.
response times are skewed for all questions. Many of them show strong outliers. For
all questions, we perform F-tests to assess whether the mean response times differ
between the experimental groups. Because normality is doubtful for the distributions
of the response times, we perform the same analysis nonparametrically, i.e., by means
of Kruskal-Wallis tests. Both tests do not indicate significant differences between the
incentive groups for any of the questions1. Note that the Figures do not show the
strong outliers but only zoom in to the range of 0 to 80/120 seconds.
Item Nonresponse
Figures 4.21 to 4.28 show the amount of item nonresponse for each of the questions
depending on the incentive treatment. Even though there is some variation in the
amount of item nonresponse, we do not find a general pattern. However, a test of
1Tables showing p-values for the tests of group differences for response times, item nonresponse and
insufficient answers can be found in Appendix B.
46
4.3 Results
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
4.5 Euro
4.0 Euro
3.5 Euro
3.0 Euro
2.5 Euro
2.0 Euro
1.5 Euro
1.0 Euro
0.5 Euro
request only
no incentive, no request
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Percent of Missing Data
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l G
ro
up
Missing Values in Disease Question
Figure 4.23: Item nonresponse in the disease question.
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Figure 4.24: Item nonresponse in the life expectancy question.
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Figure 4.25: Item nonresponse in the income question.
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Figure 4.26: Item nonresponse in the UB II question.
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Figure 4.27: Item nonresponse in the employment question.
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Figure 4.28: Item nonresponse in the standard of living question.
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Figure 4.29: Wrong answers in the calories question.
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Figure 4.30: Heaping in the doctor visits question.
equal proportions between all groups finds significant differences between the incen-
tive groups for doctor visits and income (10%-level). Multivariate analysis of the effects
of the experimental treatment on the amount of item nonresponse for all questions
will be studied further in Section 4.3.3.
Unsatisfactory Answers
Figures 4.29 to 4.34 show the amount of rounding and heaping and incorrect answers
depending on the incentive treatment. We do not find differences between the incen-
tive treatments for most of the questions, but we do find differences for the amount of
wrong answers in the calories question and for heaping in the life expectancy question
on the 10%-level. Multivariate analysis will be performed in Section 4.3.3.
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Figure 4.31: Heaping in the life expectancy question.
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Figure 4.32: Rounding to multiples of 500 in the income question.
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Figure 4.33: Heaping in the employment question.
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Figure 4.34: Heaping in the standard of living question.
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Figure 4.35: Time spent on all questions of the experiment
Time Spent on All Variables and Missing or Heaped and Incorrect Answers on all
Variables
Figures 4.35, 4.36 and 4.37 show the amount of time spent on all questions of the
experiment and the number of missing and unsatisfactory answers in all eight ques-
tions of the experiment. As expected from the previous Sections we do not find any
significant differences between the experimental groups.
Validation of Unemployment Benefit II, Income and Employment History
In this Section, we validate the responses to the UB II, income, and employment his-
tory questions using the administrative data of the FEA. By doing this, we are able to
directly assess the measurement error in income and the years of the longest employ-
ment phase as well as misreporting in the UB II question. Although the questions
were designed to match the administrative data information, there are some chal-
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Figure 4.36: Proportion of missing items in all questions of the experiment
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Figure 4.37: Proportion of unsatisfactory answers in all questions of the experiment
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lenges that are described in the following paragraphs.
For the validation of UB II, income, and employment history, we can only use the
662 respondents who consented to linking their survey response to the administrative
data of the employment agency. As the sample cases were drawn from these admin-
istrative data, information on all respondents is easily available 2. The administrative
data do neither contain information on self-employment nor information on civil ser-
vants (see Chapter 2.1). We find four respondents whose reported age differs from
the age information in the register data. As we can not be sure that we have inter-
viewed the right person, we drop these cases, leaving 658 cases for the analyses. The
placement of the request for consent to data linkage has been experimentally varied:
75% of the respondents received the request at the beginning of the interview, 25% at
the end of the interview, i.e., after the incentive intervention. The placement of the
consent question might affect the responses to the experimental questions: respon-
dents receiving the linkage consent question prior to the experiment might be aware
of the fact that we know the true answers to the questions, and therefore behave dif-
ferently than respondents who are not informed about the administrative data yet. All
multivariate analyses of the validation questions control for the consent placement.
To find possible sources of discrepancy of survey answers and administrative records,
we first compare the reported employment status with the administrative status (Table
4.7). According to administrative data, there are only few respondents who have more
than one job at the same time (4.4%, 29 respondents). All of these have a mini job and
an additional job, i.e., one respondent is doing a vocational training, 13 respondents
have a part-time job, and 15 have a full-time employment. For these respondents,
we define the job with the higher income as their main job to be compared with the
survey response.
The match between the reported and administrative employment status is quite
good. As expected, most of the people who report being self-employed do not have a
job according to the administrative data. Only four of them have a part-time or a mini
job, and it is likely that those respondents define self-employment as their main job.
As we do not have information on their income from self-employment, we drop all
respondents who report to be self-employed from the analyses for income and longest
employment phase, leaving 621 cases.
The analyses for unemployment benefit are based on all consenting respondents. Only
11 consenting respondents did not respond to the UB II question, and are therefore
not part of the analyses. Respondents were asked for UB II on household level, which
can differ from the benefit community level as it is used in the administrative data
2The data sets used for these analyses are IAB Beschäftigtenhistorik (BeH), Version 08.07, Nürnberg
2012 and IAB Leistungshistorik Grundsicherungsempfänger SGB II (LHG), Version 06.04, Nürnberg
2011 as well as IAB Leistungshistorik Grundsicherungsempfänger in zugelassenen kommunalen
Trägern (XLHG), Version 01.10, Nürnberg 2011.
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full time part time mini job training not employed
no answer 4 2 0 0 7
don’t know 0 0 1 0 1
self-employed 0 2 2 0 33
full time 251 10 0 1 22
part time 14 75 4 0 8
mini job 1 2 31 0 7
vocational training 0 0 0 13 4
maternity leave 2 3 1 0 20
unemployed 1 0 5 0 62
not working 2 0 9 0 58
Table 4.7: Match of reported and administrative employment status
(see Section 2.1). In principle, respondents can live in a household that consists of
more than one benefit community, and thus asking for UB II on the household level
is not equal to asking for UB II on the community level. Some “misreport” might be
due to the difference between household and benefit community. As the respondents
were randomly assigned to the experimental groups, respondents who are wrongly
found to have misreported their UB II status should equally likely be found in the
treatment groups as well. Comparisons between groups should not be affected by
these “false-positives”, but the discrepancy between administrative records and the
survey question can add some additional noise. We do not find any difference in UB
II recipiency between the treatment groups according to the administrative data.
The 60 respondents who did not report the number of years of their longest employ-
ment phase are dropped, leaving 561 cases for the analyses. When asked for the longest
employment phase, respondents were told not to count a job change as a break, but
were not given further instructions how such a break is defined. Therefore, we use
three different ways of defining a break in the employment phase:
1. We always count it as a break when a respondent did not have a job for at least
one day.
2. We only count it as a break if the next job starts later than the first day of the
following month after one job ended.
3. We only count it as a break if the next job starts later than the next month.
Respondents were asked to report their longest employment phase as years and
months of this phase. For validation, we construct the longest employment phase
according to administrative data in the same way. Due to a high amount of missing
information in the month variable, we only validate the years. The three definitions
lead to the same longest employment phase for 81.5% of the respondents (Figure
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Figure 4.38: Histogram of longest employment phase in register data according to the
three definitions.
4.38), the correlation of the reported and administrative longest employment phase
is about 0.8 for all definitions. Although all respondents held a social security con-
tributing job (sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigung) within the last 10 years,
the administrative data do not necessarily cover their whole employment history as
phases of self-employment between jobs are not captured. As a consequence, times
of self-employment only appear to be a break in the employment phase in the admin-
istrative data. Moreover, register data is only available from 1975 in West Germany
and 1993 in East Germany. This implies that the longest employment phase from the
administrative data is only the lower bound for the true longest employment phase.
Reported durations that are longer than those computed from the administrative data
might but need not be correct. However, the comparison between the groups is still
valid as we do not find differences in the administrative data longest employment
phase between the incentive groups for any of the three definitions.
For the validation of the personal income, we drop 108 respondents who did not
report their income. The register income of 44 respondents equals the monthly so-
cial security contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) of the year
2012, or, in case of unemployment, equals the income ceiling of the year of their last
employment (see Section 2.1). We drop these respondents from the measurement er-
ror analysis because it is clear that their reported income does not equal the register
income due to censoring in the register data. This leaves 467 respondents, 329 who
are currently employed and 138 who are currently unemployed. The experimental
groups do not differ significantly with respect to their administrative data income
(overall and separated by employment status).
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The income question was asked to match the administrative information, i.e., re-
spondents were asked for their last income from work before taxes. In the case of
more than one job, the income was summed up. Respondents who were currently
unemployed were asked to report the last monthly income from their last job. As
it can be assumed to be far more complex to recall an income one received years
ago, we separate our analyses according to the employment status as reported by the
administrative data.
In the univariate analyses, we have seen a strong peak at e 400 that we do not
expect from theory. Taking a closer look at these respondents, we can see that they
basically belong to two groups: respondents who hold a mini job, and respondents
who are currently unemployed according to the administrative data (Table 4.8).
register income in e reported income in e register employment prev. month
188.17 400 mini job
405.48 400 mini job
270.86 400 mini job
406.41 400 mini job
403.62 400 mini job
357.43 400 mini job
341.33 400 mini job
396.18 400 mini job
372.62 400 mini job
206 400 not employed
78 400 not employed
834 400 not employed
44.7 400 not employed
379.68 400 not employed
407.22 400 not employed
Table 4.8: Administrative and register income for people reporting an income of ex-
actly e 400.
In 2012, the legal income limit for a mini job was e 400. None of the respondents
reporting exactly e 400 actually received exactly e 400 in the particular month. Rather,
they seem to have heaped their real income to the legal limits. Especially for the
respondents earning less than e 300, it is obvious that they do not follow a simple
rounding pattern like rounding to the next 100, but to the income they usually earn
but did not earn in the previous month. We note that, as most of these interviews
were taken in February, the income question refers to January, and it is likely that
some of the respondents were on holiday at the beginning of the year, and therefor
received a lower income than usual. In total, 17.65% of the respondents having a
mini job round to exactly e 400. The standard amount of unemployment benefit is
e 382. The unemployed respondents might round to e 400 because they had a mini
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job before, or they might receive UB II while being unemployed, and wrongly report
a rounded value as their income. Note again that the unemployed respondents are
excluded from the income measurement error analyses.
Table 4.9 shows how many reported income values correspond to a true admin-
istrative income that is rounded to the next 5, 10, 100, 500 or 1000. Employed and
non-employed respondents exhibit about the same amount of values that are rounded
to some extent. Rounding to the next 50 or 100 is the most common rounding scheme
for the employed, and rounding to the next 500 for the non-employed. In general,
non-employed respondents tend to round in broader intervals which might be due to
larger uncertainty (Ruud et al., 2014). However, most of the reported income values
do not correspond to a rounded version of the administrative income.
In the following analyses, we define measurement error as the difference between
the log reported and the log administrative income as it is common in the literature
(Bound and Krueger, 1991; Kim and Tamborini, 2012)). Figures 4.39 and 4.40 show
the empirical distributions of the reported and administrative incomes for employed
and non-employed respondents. We assume that most respondents had their income
information available when they filled in the online questionnaire, and could in prin-
ciple have looked up the correct numbers. Since we specifically asked to be as precise
as possible in the experimental request, we expect to see less measurement error for
the groups who received the request. We also expect measurement error to decrease
with the amount of the additional incentive.
reporting pattern currently employed (in %) currently not employed (in %)
rounding to 5 0.72 0.6
rounding to 10 0.72 0.91
rounding to 50 6.52 4.83
rounding to 100 6.52 6.34
rounding to 500 2.9 6.95
rounding to 1000 2.9 5.44
no rounded form 72.51 76.09
Table 4.9: Extend of income rounding for currently employed and non-employed re-
spondents.
Table 4.10 shows true and reported UB II recipiency during the last 12 months.
Overall, only about 7% of the respondents misreport UB II recipiency. Surprisingly,
we find more than 8 times more overreporting than underreporting. As receiving
unemployment benefit is socially undesirable, we usually expect respondents to un-
derreport recipiency. Social desirability might not have been a problem in this survey
because the respondents knew that the survey was conducted by the employment
agency. Moreover, these respondents consented to data linkage and might show less
misreporting than the non-consenters, as they can expect that their answer can be
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Figure 4.39: Histogram of last survey and register income for non-employed respon-
dents.
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Figure 4.40: Histogram of last month’s survey and register income for employed re-
spondents.
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Figure 4.41: Wrong answer in UB II question.
validated. On the other hand, the amount of overreporting indicates that this recall
question is hard to answer for some respondents: 8 respondents who overreport UB II
recipiency in the last 12 months received UB II earlier in 2011, whereas 26 received UB
II at some point. This can be interpreted as a recall problem rather than intentional
misreporting. Being reassured that misreport is mostly due to question complexity,
we expect that thinking hard about the answer can help to improve accuracy. Thus we
expect to find an effect of the additional incentive. Since there are only 5 respondents
underreporting UB II recipiency, we do not distinguish between underreporting and
overreporting, and only analyze both errors combined as misreport.
administrative: no UB II administrative: UB II
survey: no UB II 513 5
survey: UB II 41 87
Table 4.10: True and reported UB II recipiency.
Figure 4.41 shows the proportion of respondents giving a correct answer to the UB
II question across all experimental groups. There are neither significant differences
between the groups, nor can clear patterns be observed.
Figures 4.42, 4.43 and 4.44 show the difference between the reported and adminis-
trative years of the longest employment phase according to the three definitions. As
expected, there is much more overreporting than underreporting, and overreporting
is highest for the strictest definition. The median difference is about 1 year for all def-
initions and for all incentives groups. A possible reason for overreporting the longest
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Figure 4.42: Difference of reported and register longest employment phase according
to definition 1.
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Figure 4.43: Difference of reported and register longest employment phase according
to definition 2.
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Figure 4.44: Difference of reported and register longest employment phase according
to definition 3.
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Figure 4.45: Difference in log Survey and log register income for employed and not
employed respondents.
phase might be that respondents do not count episodes as breaks during which they
have neither been employed nor been registered as unemployed. Underreporting can
be due to counting gapless job changes as breaks. As there is no big difference be-
tween the three definitions, the first, the strictest one, is used for further analyses.
Figure 4.45 shows the difference between the reported and the administrative in-
come for currently employed and unemployed respondents. The employed respon-
dents exhibit an average measurement error that is close to zero for all incentive
groups. In contrast, the non-employed respondents overreport their true income sys-
tematically. Again, no effect of the experimental conditions can be found.
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4.3.3 Multivariate Findings
Modelling Time to Answer a Question, Item Nonresponse and Unsatisfactory
Answers
In the following, we run multiple regression models using time to answer the ques-
tion, item nonresponse and unsatisfactory answers as response variables. As the
time to answer a question exhibits many strong outliers, we use median regression
to model the common trend. In contrast to mean regression median regression is ro-
bust to outliers. Logistic regression is used for item nonresponse and unsatisfactory
answers. It is not necessary to control for socio-demographic variables as these vari-
ables are distributed randomly across the experimental groups. However, the sample
stratum however is controlled for as the stratum variable was not fully random for
the experimental conditions. Further, all models include an indicator of the order of
the health and finance block in order to control for the fact that the treatment might
only influence the questions directly fielded after the experimental request. Further
variables of interest are the incentive treatment, indicators for the response behavior
prior to the experiment (time spent on the questionnaire before the request (“time
before”), measured in quartiles, and the proportion of missing answers prior to the
experiment (prop. NA), measured in tertiles), as well as interactions of the behavior
and the treatment groups. For unsatisfactory answers, we also test whether the time
spent on the question (in quintiles) improves the model fit, as the time spent on the
question might improve the quality of the answer.
For all models, we test a linear against a quadratic term of the incentive, and only
report the results for the better model in the following. We start with models only
containing main effects and then add interactions if they improve the goodness of
fit. The improvement is investigated in terms of likelihood-ratio tests for the logis-
tic models, and in terms of Wald tests (Koenker and Bassett, 1982) for the median
regressions.
Time to Answer a Question The request to think hard and the additional incentives
are found to have no significant effect on the time to answer the questions, see Table
4.11 and Table 4.12 (α = 5%). In general, we find that the time a respondent spent on
the questionnaire before the request is positively associated with the time spent on
each of the questions of the experiment. Interactions with the incentive treatment are
only part of the model for the employment question, though not significant. For the
same question, the proportion of missing items prior to the experiment is also found
to interact with the additional incentives: the negative effect of the proportion of item
nonresponse is reduced by the additional incentives.
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Calories Doctors Diseases Life Expectancy
Value Std. Error Value Std. Error Value Std. Error Value Std. Error
Intercept 11.0000 0.8549 13.9930 1.4012 18.0010 1.0195 12.3750 0.8268
request 0.0003 0.7695 0.5064 1.3024 1.4259 1.0782 -0.7490 0.6532
incentives 0.0000 0.1477 -0.0010 0.2636 -0.5711 0.3313 0.2500 0.2444
time before cat. 2 2.0007 0.4727 2.0008 0.7860 5.2866 1.0419 3.1250 0.4466
time before cat. 3 3.0017 0.5119 5.9993 1.0587 8.0010 0.9073 6.3750 0.9983
time before cat. 4 6.0013 0.8239 12.4986 1.2218 14.1433 1.6829 11.001 1.3556
prop. NA cat. 2 -0.0013 0.5099 -0.4989 0.8683 0.2866 0.9171 0.6240 0.7143
prop. NA cat. 3 -1.0007 0.5095 -1.0002 0.9362 -1.5721 1.0652 -0.3760 0.6023
UB II stratum 0.9997 0.6267 0.5059 0.9672 3.1433 1.4139 1.6250 0.9593
employed stratum -0.0013 0.4460 -0.4969 0.8107 0.8567 0.8332 0.3740 0.6250
question in first block 0.9997 0.4133 2.0013 0.7194 -0.5701 0.8237 5.2500 0.5419
Table 4.11: Results of median regression for time to answer the questions of the health
block.
Income UB II Employment Living Standard
Value Std. Error Value Std. Error Value Std. Error Value Std. Error
Intercept 24.0215 1.9963 7.9980 0.3725 46.5553 5.6244 22.3105 1.3816
request 0.0595 1.9120 0.0010 0.3319 -3.7078 3.8404 -0.3115 1.4625
incentives -0.2400 0.4268 0.0001 0.0681 -0.5068 1.7793 0.3750 0.3727
time before cat. 2 4.3405 1.2662 1.0000 0.2303 9.5113 4.0010 5.8145 1.2884
time before cat. 3 11.4195 1.5759 1.9990 0.2299 17.4447 4.5914 9.4375 1.3050
time before cat. 4 20.6390 2.0678 3.0010 0.3612 36.1315 5.8417 15.5010 1.4888
prop. NA cat. 2 -1.9795 1.3636 0.0010 0.2269 -3.6858 5.4948 1.2500 1.1725
prop. NA cat. 3 -5.8410 1.4616 0.0000 0.2311 -22.4054 4.7266 -1.3730 1.1470
UB II stratum 0.4995 1.4550 1.0010 0.2471 -8.7928 2.2085 -1.3125 1.3335
employed stratum 0.3395 1.3342 -0.9990 0.2130 4.3014 2.2230 0.4365 1.0620
question in first block -2.1815 1.1407 0.0000 0.1853 -0.8685 1.8243 -5.56050 0.9544
incentives*time before cat. 2 - - - - -0.3233 1.5681 - -
incentives*time before cat. 3 - - - - -0.7532 1.5841 - -
incentives*time before cat. 4 - - - - 1.3670 2.7742 - -
incentives*prop. NA cat. 2 - - - - 0.8066 1.8920 - -
incentives*prop. NA cat. 3 - - - - 3.7293 1.6146 - -
Table 4.12: Results of median regression for time to answer the questions of the fi-
nance block.
Item Nonresponse The results for the regression of item nonresponse on incentives
can be found in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14. We do not include an analysis of item non-
response in the UB II question, as the level of item nonresponse is very low (3%). We
find significant quadratic effects of the incentives on the amount of item nonresponse
for the calories question that interact with the proportion of item nonresponse prior
to the request. The effect of the additional incentives on item nonresponse is reverse
u-shaped. An illustration of the effect depending on nonresponse prior to the inter-
vention can be found in Figure 4.46, with all other variables kept at their means or
modes. Item nonresponse decreases with the amount of the incentive only for the re-
spondents who already show low item nonresponse. In contrast, item nonresponse is
even increased for respondents who show high amounts of item nonresponse in gen-
eral. Item nonresponse in the calories question is mostly due to choosing the “don’t
know” option. For this question, “don’t know” might in fact be an honest and correct
answer. Thus, an increase in item nonresponse might be interpreted as an increase in
response quality. It might be that highly motivated respondents, i.e., respondents who
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show little item nonresponse prior to the experiment, actually looked up the true an-
swer and therefore decreased item nonresponse, whereas less motivated respondents
decided to be honest and choose “don’t know” when appropriate. Incentives also
affect item nonresponse in the doctor visits question (10% level). The relation be-
tween the additional incentives and item nonresponse is found to be u-shaped with a
minimum at about e 2 to e 3 on average.
Calories Doctors Diseases Life Expectancy
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
Intercept -1.1515 0.3628 -1.1518 0.4099 -1.8108 0.5679 -1.0572 0.4148
request -0.2640 0.3041 0.4631 0.3843 0.4577 0.5233 0.0156 0.3768
incentives 0.5590 0.2895 -0.7156 0.2596 -0.0331 0.0915 0.0664 0.0722
incentives^2 -0.0998 0.0638 0.1541 0.0570 - - - -
time before cat. 2 -0.0598 0.2175 -0.2496 0.2652 -0.5438 0.3484 -0.4184 0.2713
time before cat. 3 0.0909 0.2124 -0.7860 0.2923 -0.3118 0.3279 -0.3235 0.2629
time before cat. 4 0.1347 0.2118 -0.5341 0.2754 -0.8480 0.3726 -0.8059 0.2858
prop. NA cat. 2 -0.5681 0.3719 -1.9789 0.3176 -1.6981 0.3633 -2.5795 0.3824
prop. NA cat. 3 -0.4297 0.3569 -0.9597 0.2289 -1.5005 0.3358 -0.9563 0.2178
UB II stratum 0.4157 0.1879 0.5800 0.2453 0.1677 0.3103 0.6681 0.2341
employed stratum 0.0673 0.1794 0.1035 0.2503 -0.0208 0.3101 -0.0789 0.2515
question in first block 0.1139 0.1496 0.0925 0.2009 -0.0493 0.2539 -0.0995 0.1975
incentives*prop. NA cat. 2 -0.3107 0.4474 - - - - - -
incentives*prop. NA cat. 3 -0.1099 0.4049 - - - - - -
incentives2*prop. NA cat. 2 0.0019 0.1075 - - - - - -
incentives2*prop. NA cat. 3 0.0106 0.0919 - - - - - -
Table 4.13: Results of logistic regression for item nonresponse in the questions of the
health block.
Quadratic effects of the incentive on the probability of item nonresponse are also
found for the income (10% level) and the employment questions. As for the doctor
visits question, item nonresponse is lowest for an additional incentive of about e 2 to
e 3 on average. We do not find effects of incentives on the two expectation questions:
Neither item nonresponse in the standard of living, nor in the life expectancy question
is affected by the incentive treatment. This might be explained by the fact that these
two questions allow for a “50%”-response, which is often treated as an additional way
of saying “don’t know” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000, 2002). Thus, respondents choos-
ing “don’t know” might not lack motivation to choose a number, but rather be very
unsure, a problem that can not be solved by the additional incentive. We do not find
effects of the incentive treatment for the disease question, either. For this question,
however, nonresponse is quite low and mostly driven by “no answer” (see 4.6). We
find u-shaped effects for the doctor visits, income and employment questions. Sepa-
rate logistic regressions for “don’t know” and “no answer” show that incentives only
significantly affect the “don’t know” response for the calories, income and doctor vis-
its questions. For these questions, the propensity of “no answer”, which can be seen
as reluctance to respond to the questions, is not affected by the incentive. This and the
fact that there is no effect in the disease question can be interpreted as incentives be-
ing able to influence motivation to choose some substantive answer rather than “don’t
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Interaction Effect in the Calories Question
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Figure 4.46: Effect of the additional incentive, interacted with the proportion of miss-
ing answers prior to the intervention, on item nonresponse in the calories
question.
Effect of the additional incentive, interacted with the proportion of missing answers
prior to the intervention, on item nonresponse in the calories question. The
propensity for item nonresponse is found to decrease with the amount of incentives
for respondents who already show a low item nonresponse propensity. For
respondents with a high item nonresponse propensity, however, item nonresponse
propensity in the calories question is further increased.
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know”, but not being able to affect reluctance to give an answer. We generally find
that the amount of missing information before the request is positively, the time spent
on the interview before the request is negatively associated with item nonresponse
in the questions of the experiment. Only for the calories question, incentives interact
with the behavior prior to the intervention.
Income Employment Living Standard
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
Intercept -0.1523 0.3158 -0.8505 0.4630 -0.8899 0.3684
request 0.1160 0.2990 0.4253 0.4458 -0.1045 0.3186
incentives -0.3722 0.2045 -0.6154 0.3023 -0.0626 0.0690
incentives^2 0.0798 0.0446 0.1268 0.0668 - -
time before cat. 2 -0.4974 0.2147 -0.9154 0.3088 -0.2273 0.2481
time before cat. 3 -0.5477 0.2149 -1.1000 0.3172 -0.5398 0.2616
time before cat. 4 -0.5409 0.2151 -1.2263 0.3212 -0.4674 0.2568
prop. NA cat. 2 -1.4248 0.2023 -3.2310 0.5253 -1.4109 0.2512
prop. NA cat. 3 -1.0190 0.1832 -1.7532 0.2876 -0.8843 0.2151
UB II stratum 0.0804 0.1994 1.2000 0.2718 0.9539 0.2208
employed stratum 0.0702 0.1830 -0.0587 0.3128 0.0341 0.2371
question in first block 0.1324 0.1553 0.0478 0.2299 -0.1299 0.1844
Table 4.14: Results of logistic regression for item nonresponse in the questions of the
finance block.
Modelling Unsatisfactory Answers Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show the results of the re-
gressions for rounding, heaping, an incorrect answers, for all respondents who gave
a substantive answer to the questions of the incentive experiment. For the life ex-
pectancy question, we find significant effects of the request to think hard and the
additional incentives. The request to think hard decreases the probability of heaping
to 50%. At the same time, the additional incentives increase the heaping propensity.
Still, the groups receiving an additional incentive show less heaping than the “no
incentive, no request” group up to an incentive of e 4. We do not find interactions
between the incentive and behavior prior to the request for any of the experimental
questions. Time spent on the question is found to have an effect on the doctor visits
and calories questions: respondents taking less time than the third quintile show less,
respondents taking more time show more wrong answers in the calories question. In
contrast, respondents in the fifth time quintile show less heaping in the doctor visits
question than the respondents in the third quintile.
Modeling the Time Spent on the Experimental Block and Total Amounts of Item
Nonresponse and Unsatisfactory Answers We do not find significant effects of the
request to think hard or the additional incentives on the time spent on all eight ques-
tions of the incentive experiment. Moreover, the total amount of item nonresponse
and unsatisfactory answers does not significantly differ by the experimental condi-
tions. We find that the time spent on the interview before the experiment has a posi-
tive effect on the time spent on the questions of the experiment, and a negative effect
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Calories Doctors Life Expectancy
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
Intercept 0.4325 0.3423 -0.8861 0.3286 -2.5952 0.5012
request 0.1009 0.2670 0.1155 0.2521 -0.8802 0.4134
incentives -0.0122 0.0553 0.0557 0.0515 0.1998 0.0928
time before cat. 2 0.3963 0.2152 0.3021 0.2032 0.2984 0.3905
time before cat. 3 0.1214 0.2164 0.6505 0.2039 0.5911 0.3728
time before cat. 4 -0.1191 0.2264 0.6337 0.2157 0.5636 0.3735
prop. NA cat. 2 0.0598 0.1793 0.0168 0.1613 0.6929 0.2974
prop. NA cat. 3 0.1635 0.1930 -0.5379 0.1786 0.3874 0.3255
UB II stratum 0.0334 0.2083 0.1140 0.1855 0.5052 0.2984
employed stratum 0.0380 0.1720 0.0715 0.1574 -0.0541 0.2913
question in first block -0.2144 0.1523 0.1859 0.1390 -0.7317 0.2491
response time 1 -0.2956 0.2386 -0.0544 0.2268 - -
response time 2 -0.4369 0.2267 -0.0881 0.2099 - -
response time 4 0.4185 0.2407 -0.2240 0.2142 - -
response time 5 0.6336 0.2387 -0.8312 0.2240 - -
Table 4.15: Results of logistic regression for rounding and heaping in the questions of
the health block.
Income Employment Living Standard
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
Intercept -1.2742 0.3536 -2.2407 0.3726 -1.4955 0.3618
request 0.4290 0.3160 0.2372 0.3111 -0.3664 0.3051
incentives -0.0392 0.0608 0.0579 0.0586 -0.0204 0.0678
time before 2 0.2051 0.2372 0.8325 0.2529 0.2613 0.2612
time before cat. 3 0.1025 0.2395 0.7082 0.2536 -0.0511 0.2704
time before cat. 4 0.0296 0.2450 0.5592 0.2583 0.2732 0.2589
prop. NA cat. 2 -0.4405 0.1975 0.0540 0.1942 0.2257 0.2200
prop. NA cat. 3 0.0625 0.2052 0.4541 0.2008 0.3352 0.2283
UB II stratum -0.9308 0.2588 -0.5360 0.2364 0.1220 0.2379
employed stratum 0.2047 0.1802 -0.0325 0.1773 -0.0563 0.2065
question in first block -0.0841 0.1652 0.0788 0.1606 -0.1603 0.1800
Table 4.16: Results of logistic regression for rounding and heaping in the questions of
the finance block.
on the sum of item nonresponse. Item nonresponse prior to the request is positively
associated with item nonresponse in the experiment, and it is negatively associated
with the time spent on the experiment. None of these indicators interact with the
incentive experiment.
Modelling The Correct Answers to the Validation Questions
For the validation questions, we use the same covariates as before. We also use logistic
models for the misreport in UB II, and median regression for measurement error in
the years of the longest employment and measurement error in income. As we have
seen in Section 4.3.2, the measurement error in the longest employment spell is not
symmetric but skewed to the right. The measurement error distribution for income is
not symmetric either, especially for currently non-employed respondents. As for the
models for the unsatisfactory answers, we include the time spent on the questions,
measured in quintiles. For the employment history and income question, we also
include an indicator for current employment according to the administrative data
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Time Spent on The Experiment Sum of Missing Items Sum of Missing or Unsatisfactory Items
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
Intercept 177.0826 13.7667 -0.6958 0.1422 0.6785 0.0843
request -1.3884 13.1672 0.0111 0.1111 0.0222 0.0714
incentives -0.6116 2.3678 -0.0072 0.0224 0.0059 0.0143
time before cat. 2 36.2498 7.5944 -0.3169 0.0830 -0.0015 0.0549
time before cat. 3 76.1366 7.7990 -0.3501 0.0832 -0.0225 0.0550
time before cat. 4 158.0541 13.8539 -0.4036 0.0841 -0.0616 0.0557
prop. NA cat. 2 -9.0826 7.7425 0.6008 0.1011 0.1226 0.0515
prop. NA cat. 3 -31.9429 8.3888 1.4067 0.0914 0.4321 0.049
UB II stratum -0.2498 8.1739 0.4248 0.0733 0.1182 0.0496
employed stratum -5.6922 7.6561 0.0268 0.0773 0.0155 0.0462
question in first block 5.5005 6.6853 0.0220 0.0607 -0.0247 0.0390
Table 4.17: Results of Poisson regression for item nonresponse and unsatisfactory an-
swers and median regression for time spent on the experiment.
(yes/no). We expect these questions to be harder to answer for respondents who are
currently non-employed. Thinking longer about the answer could be interpreted as
an indicator of uncertainty.
We do not find an effect of the request or the additional incentive on misreporting
UB II (see Table 4.18). The respondents sampled from the employed stratum show
significantly less misreporting than respondents from the other two strata, whereas
respondents from the UB II stratum exhibit most misreporting. As respondents from
the employed stratum have never receive any social benefit, the question is not hard
to answer for them, and only respondents from the other two strata might suffer from
recall error or have an incentive to give the socially desired answer. Surprisingly, there
is more misreporting for respondents taking more time to answer the question than
for the quicker ones.
There is no effect of the request or additional incentive on measurement error for
the employment phase (Table 4.18). Respondents who spent the most time on this
question show the highest measurement error. As expected, measurement error is
lower for currently employed than currently non-employed respondents.
The best model for measurement error in income includes interactions between the
additional incentives and behavior prior to the experiment, though not significant
(Table 4.18). Measurement error is smaller for the last month’s income of currently
employed respondents than for the last income of currently non-employed respon-
dents.
4.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have presented the results of an incentive experiment within a
web survey. In the experiment, we tried to increase the quality of survey response by
asking some of the respondents to take their time, think hard about the next questions,
and give as good answers as possible. We have followed the research by Cannell et al.
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UB II misreport Employment phase measurement error Income measurement error
β Std. Error β Std. Error β Std. Error
(Intercept) -2.8687 0.8103 1.7665 1.2925 0.3274 0.1764
request 0.0540 0.6395 0.0060 0.9237 0.1198 0.0797
incentives 0.2078 0.1219 0.0958 0.1822 0.0212 0.0964
incentives^2 – – – – -0.0037 0.0204
consent late 0.2921 0.6546 0.7725 1.0784 0.0131 0.0679
time before cat. 2 -0.0233 0.5174 0.5030 0.6757 0.0721 0.0958
time before cat. 3 -0.3467 0.5244 0.8443 0.7261 -0.0003 0.1053
time before cat. 4 -0.3063 0.5018 0.7725 0.7662 0.0452 0.1164
prop. NA cat. 2 0.0507 0.3929 -0.4491 0.5800 0.1033 0.0854
prop. NA cat. 3 -0.1262 0.4195 0.1198 0.7015 0.0509 0.1038
UB II stratum 0.8498 0.3581 -0.5150 0.6939 0.0499 0.0624
employed stratum -1.0374 0.5311 -0.5868 0.5911 -0.0176 0.0430
question in first block -0.3537 0.3291 -0.5030 0.5160 0.0097 0.0427
employed (admin) – – -2.1677 0.6199 -0.6118 0.1353
response time 1 -1.2191 0.7006 0.5269 0.7188 – –
response time 2 -0.4871 0.6954 0.7904 0.7727 – –
response time 4 0.1324 0.4891 0.7305 0.7774 – –
response time 5 1.1204 0.4398 3.4251 0.9698 – –
incentives*time before cat. 2 – – – – 0.0705 0.1226
incentives*time before cat. 3 – – – – 0.0615 0.1310
incentives*time before cat. 4 – – – – 0.0424 0.1302
incentives*prop. NA cat. 2 – – – – -0.1167 0.1035
incentives*prop. NA cat. 3 – – – – 0.0467 0.1289
incentives^2*time before cat. 2 – – – – -0.0213 0.0294
incentives^2*time before cat. 3 – – – – -0.0196 0.0300
incentives^2*time before cat. 4 – – – – -0.0155 0.0297
incentives^2*prop. NA cat. 2 – – – – 0.0300 0.0246
incentives^2*prop. NA cat. 3 – – – – -0.0096 0.0293
Table 4.18: Results of logistic and median regression for validation questions.
(1981) who found for personal interviews that such requests can increase response
quality as measured by the numbers of topics mentioned in answers to open-ended
questions and precision of answers. In our experiment, for most of the respondents
who received the request to think hard, the request was combined with an additional
incentive from e 0.50 to e 4.50. We have hypothesized that the request to think hard
increases the quality of the answers and the time spent on the question compared to
the respondents who do not receive this request. Further, we have assumed the quality
to increase as the amount of the additional incentive increases. Our hypotheses are
only confirmed in part. We find the experimental intervention not to affect response
times of any of the questions and only to affect the quality of the answers to some of
the questions.
Moreover, incentives lead to reduction of item nonresponse for some questions. In
the multivariate analyses, we find that the additional incentive affects item nonre-
sponse in the calories, doctor visits, income and employment questions. Incentives
are found to have no effect in the expectancy questions. This might be explained
by the fact that these questions allow less motivated respondents to choose the non-
informative “50%”-response, and item nonresponse might be differently motivated
than for questions that do not have such a response option. In general, there is
some evidence that incentives are able to motivate respondents not to respond “don’t
know”, but they are not able to prevent “no answer”. For the calories question,
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the additional incentives interact with the proportion of item nonresponse prior to
the experiment: only respondents who already show little item nonresponse show
a further decrease in item nonresponse as the incentive increases. For respondents
showing middle or high item nonresponse prior to the intervention, the item nonre-
sponse propensity is not affected or even increased. We argue that for this question,
“don’t know” might be the best answer for some respondents, and the increase in
item nonresponse for the less motivated respondents, i.e., respondents showing more
than average item nonresponse prior to the intervention, might be a sign for increased
response quality. The highly motivated respondents show a decrease in item nonre-
sponse that might be due to looking up the right answer. Moreover, we find that the
request to think hard decreases heaping to 50% in the life expectancy question, but
not in the standard of living question for which the heap at 50% is much more pro-
nounced. The propensities for unsatisfactory answers is not affected by the incentives
for any other question. This might be due to respondents just not knowing how to
provide good answers. To keep the instruction short, we did not include explanations
how to improve response quality.
In order to overcome some of the shortcomings of this experiment, based on this
Chapter, we conducted an additional experiment in the later IAB web survey “Her-
ausforderungen am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt 2014”. In this experiment, respondents
did not only receive the request to think hard, but also were asked to agree to giving
good answers, as was done by Cannell et al. (1981). Furthermore, respondents were
told to check outside sources or look up answers if possible. In this experiment how-
ever, no additional incentives were given. At the end of the interview, respondents
were asked to judge the question complexity and report about their use of outside
information. These data will help to understand respondents reaction on the request
to think hard. Validation data for this survey will be available as of the beginning of
2016.
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Item Nonresponse and Measurement Error in
Income Questions
5.1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that surveys asking for income suffer from a high amount of
item nonresponse in income questions. For personal and telephone surveys, one of-
ten finds income to have more missing information than any other question (Krumpal,
2013). Even if an income is reported, the quality of this report is usually unknown.
Any difference between the reported and true income value can lead to biased esti-
mates. Especially if item nonresponse and measurement error are related to the true
unknown income value, this will lead to bias that can not in general be solved by
imputation or correction procedures (Rubin, 1976).
Personal income is often found to affect measurement error in personal interviews
(see for example Moore et al. (2000); Bound et al. (2001, 1994). In contrast, it is not clear
whether this relationship exists in web surveys as well. There is some evidence that
web surveys are able to decrease measurement error in sensitive questions (Kreuter
et al., 2008) but it is not known if the same findings hold for income questions.
In the following Chapter, we analyze the effect of personal income and other per-
sonal characteristics on the propensity of not reporting an income value and the qual-
ity of the reported income. We do this by linking survey data from the telephone and
web survey “Work and Consumption in Germany” (see Chapter 2.3) to administrative
data from the German Federal Employment Agency, assuming that the administra-
tive data represent the true income (see Chapter 2.1). Our main interest is to analyze
whether the effect of personal income is the same for both modes, or if we can find
mode differences.
We will first study item nonresponse and measurement error separately for both
“sub-surveys” to see whether the usual findings can be replicated for our survey. As
the web survey is found to be highly selective for some socio-demographic variables
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(e.g., age, gender, employment type), differences in income effects between the modes
can not necessarily be attributed to the survey mode. To be able to conduct causal
inference on the effect of survey mode on item nonresponse and measurement error,
we perform propensity score matching of respondents to both modes in a second step.
5.2 Background
Errors can occur in all steps of the question answering process which in general con-
sists of three steps (Tourangeau, 1984): respondents need to (i) comprehend the ques-
tion, e.g., the income concept, (ii) recall their past income, and (iii) report an answer
that matches their income. In the first two steps, errors can for example occur because
a respondent is confused about the income concept and definitions (e.g. the definition
of gross and net income), is not able to recall her exact income, or just does not know
her income (Moore et al., 2000). Moreover, respondents might forget small income
amounts, or include black labor (Nordberg et al., 2004). In the third step, measure-
ment error might occur because the respondent might not want to share (true) income
information because she thinks it is too private and personal, or sensitive (Bradburn
and Sudman, 1979).
In general, three aspects of sensitive questions can be distinguished (Tourangeau
et al., 2000): social (un)desirablity of the answer, invasion of privacy, and risk of
disclosure of the answers to third parties. Regarding the income question, we expect
the following interrelations to be present to some extent: As social desirability is found
to be a bigger problem in personal interviews than in web surveys (Heerwegh, 2009;
Kreuter et al., 2008), the survey mode could affect income measurement error. While
there is no reason why the invasion of privacy should be different between survey
modes, the risk of disclosure of the answers could be perceived to depend on the mode.
As Heerwegh (2009) summarizes, building trust is harder in the impersonal web
survey than in a personal interview. Also, the fear of database hacks can inhibit
trust-building. However, there is no empirical support for this assumption. In our
case, we do not expect the perceived risk of disclosure to differ between the modes:
both surveys were conducted by the same well-known field agency, were stated to
be conducted by the IAB, and anonymity was ensured in the invitation letters of
both surveys. In contrast, social desirability concerns are likely to differ between the
modes. As Heerwegh (2009) argues, the social distance is larger in a web than in a
face-to-face survey. As in the telephone survey there is also an interviewer present,
one could argue that the social distance is lower in the web than in the telephone
survey, as well. We therefore expect that the web survey will lead to less socially
desirable responses than the telephone interview.
In general, there is some empirical evidence that self-administered interviews show
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less social desirability bias than face-to-face interviews (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).
Most studies however can not make use of validation data and are limited to com-
paring distributions and evaluating their findings under the assumption that higher
reports of social undesired behavior are a sign for less social desirability bias.
For example, Heerwegh (2009) concludes that the web mode shows less socially
desirable answers than the face-to-face mode when comparing response distributions
of questions on happiness, subjective health, and integration. At the same time, he
finds a decrease in data quality in the web in terms of higher item nonresponse and
“don’t know”-answers. Tourangeau and Smith (1996) find that the differences in
the reported number of sex partners between women and men decreases for self-
administered surveys compared to personal interviews as self-administration reduces
the fear of embarrassment and increases privacy. Presser and Stinson (1998) find
that respondents in self-administered surveys report less socially desirable weekly
religious attendance as compared to conventional interviews.
Kreuter et al. (2008) conclude from their validation study that the web mode yields
more accurate reports of sensitive information than the IVR and CATI mode, and that
differences are larger for socially undesired than for socially desired items. Moreover,
the perceived item sensitivity depends on survey mode and a person’s true status.
Respondents who have an undesired status find questions more sensitive than others.
Respondents, asked about their expectations, reported to expect more misreport in
the CATI than the web or IVR mode.
The effect of mode on reporting one’s income is specifically interesting as income
is a particularly sensitive question for most people as social class can be expected to
be determined by income to a large extent. Moreover, income is a focal quantity in
economic research, and any item nonresponse or measurement error can seriously
bias corresponding analyses and inflate standard errors.
The imputation of missing income values on socio-demographic and other sur-
vey variables will not lead to unbiased results if the missing mechanism is related
to the true income (Rubin, 1976), i.e., the income information is missing not at ran-
dom. Hence, imputation on observables will in general lead to biases. A relationship
between missing income information and true income is often conjectured (Rässler,
2000; Riphahn and Serfling, 2005). It has been studied by analyzing the relation of the
propensity for item nonresponse and survey indicators of income (see for example
Schräpler (2004, 2006)) but has to our knowledge never been analyzed in a validation
study. Knowing a person’s true income, we can directly model the dependence of
item nonresponse and income rather than being forced to make assumptions about
the relationship of true income and some survey indicators. We are the first to com-
pare income item nonresponse between a telephone and a web survey.
Lacking access to validation data, Smith (1991) finds for the General Social Survey
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(GSS) that item nonresponse in the income variable is higher among respondents
who are less educated and work on lower employment levels than on average. In the
context of mode effect studies for financial asset questions, Essig and Winter (2009)
conclude that a self-administered drop-off questionnaire yields better data quality (in
terms of item nonresponse and heaping) than a personal interview.
Other than for item nonresponse in income questions, validation studies on income
measurement error have been conducted frequently, and measurement error is usually
found to be non-classical. In the context of linear regression, even classical measure-
ment error will always lead to attenuation bias, i.e., bias towards zero, whereas the
direction of bias in the case of non-classical measurement error can not be predicted
(Carroll et al., 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Biemer and Lyberg, 2003). The present
study builds on prior studies that analyze measurement error in reported income by
comparing the survey report to some kind of external income source that they pre-
sume to be true (see for example Bound et al. (2001) and Moore et al. (2000) for an
overview).
Most of the validation studies were conducted in the US, and many of them use ad-
ministrative data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) containing employers’
tax reports. SSA data are used to validate survey reports in the Current Population
Survey (CPS) (Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bollinger, 1998), the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP)(Pedace and Bates, 2000; Gottschalk and Huynh, 2010;
Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Abowd and Stinson, 2013), and the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS) (Bricker and Engelhardt, 2008). Other studies use employers’ payroll
information from one single firm to validate the reported income in the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Duncan and Hill, 1985; Bound et al., 1994).
There are also some studies from Scandinavian countries which link responses to
administrative data. Examples are Nordberg et al. (2004) for the first wave of the
Finnish part of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), (Kapteyn and
Ypma, 2007) for the Swedish part of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE), and (Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007) for the Danish part
of the ECHP.
All studies, while being different in focus, find mean-reverting measurement error
in reported income. This is, the correlation between the measurement error and true
income is usually found to be negative, indicating that respondents with a high in-
come under-report, respondents with a low income over-report their incomes. Also,
some studies come to the conclusion that the negative correlation between a per-
son’s true and reported income is largely driven by strong over-reporting among low-
income respondents and moderate under-reporting of income in the higher deciles
(e.g Bollinger (1998); Nordberg et al. (2004)). For the CPS and SIPP, Bound and
Krueger (1991) and Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) also show that the measurement
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error is correlated over panel waves.
Some studies weaken the assumption of the administrative data being free of errors
by allowing for measurement error in both data sources (Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007;
Abowd and Stinson, 2013). For the Swedish part of the SHARE, Kapteyn and Ypma
(2007) discuss the possibility of a mismatch between survey and administrative data,
finding that the mean-reverting effect gets smaller once one allows for error in the
matching procedure. They also find the administrative data to be biased to some de-
gree. Abowd and Stinson (2013) allow for measurement error in both data sources
and give three possible reasons for not considering the administrative data as “truth”:
definitional differences between the data sources, error in the administrative data, and
error in the matching process. The administrative income records we are using are
known to be very accurate (see Chapter 2), and as we draw our sample from admin-
istrative data and can link survey responses back to the administrative data, errors in
the matching process are virtually impossible. However, as explained in Chapter 2,
there are small definitional differences between the survey and administrative data.
These can be expected to occur in the same way in both modes, not corrupting the
mode comparison.
The literature on effects of socio-demographics and job characteristics on measure-
ment error in reporting of income shows mixed results: There is some evidence for
income under-reporting by younger and older single persons (Nordberg et al., 2004).
Also, females are found to misreport their income less often than men (Bollinger, 1998;
Bound and Krueger, 1991; Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007). Part-time em-
ployed respondents report with more error than full-time employed, and reporting
quality increases with age (Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007). The effect of
age differs by gender (Gottschalk and Huynh, 2010). Some studies include education
in their analysis, but only find weak or no association with measurement error (Bound
and Krueger, 1991; Bricker and Engelhardt, 2008; Pedace and Bates, 2000). Also, race
is not found to affect income measurement error Pedace and Bates (2000).
In a recent validation study, comparing SIPP responses to SSA records, Kim and
Tamborini (2014) allow the effects of socio-demographics to differ by true income.
Running separate regressions for respondents belonging to different income quintiles
based on the SSA data, they find that some effects differ between the income sub-
samples: in the low-income groups, black respondents show higher over-reporting
than whites; in the high-income groups, blacks show higher under-reporting, sug-
gesting that mean-reversion is stronger among black than white respondents. A sim-
ilar result is found in Kim and Tamborini (2012). Moreover, women are less likely
than men to over-report their income in the lowest income quintile, but more likely to
under-report their income in the highest quintile. Both effects cancel each other out.
(Not) having included the interaction of true income and other socio-demographic
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variables within regression analyses might explain the mixed results in the studies
cited above.
All these studies need to link survey and administrative data, a task which is to
some degree based on probabilistic procedures. The strength of our study is that
we drew the sample from the administrative records and can directly link the sur-
vey information back to the administrative data using a unique person identifier —
provided that consent to data linkage is given. Most of the validation data from the
studies mentioned above stem from tax information. As Moore et al. (2000) point out,
tax reports have some drawbacks: they only cover earnings above a certain threshold,
some people are not captured in the tax system, and special regulations such as joint
return for married couples make it hard to identify a single person’s income. The
validation data set we are using captures the respondents’ individual income before
taxes. However, not all respondents are captured in the social security system and
hence part of the administrative data (see 2.1).
Last, while all previous studies focus on face-to-face surveys, we are the first to
study item nonresponse and measurement error in a web survey, and to compare the
results to a telephone survey based on the same population.
Our research questions are:
• Can previous findings be replicated using German administrative records?
• Is the relation between income and item nonresponse in the income question
moderated by the survey mode?
• Is the relation between income and measurement error in the income question
moderated by survey mode?
5.3 Data
For our analyses, we use the survey data from the telephone and web survey “Work
and Consumption in Germany” (for a description of the study see Chapter 2). Like we
did in Chapter 4, we are linking the consenting respondents from both surveys (2,281
consenters for the CATI, 662 consenters for the web survey) to the administrative
records of the FEA. We again exclude all respondents whose reported age differs
from the administrative age by more than one year (see Chapter 4.3.2), as we can
not be sure that we have interviewed the right person. We also need to drop all
respondents who did not receive the question in CATI1, respondents who report to
be self-employed, and respondents whose administrative income is censored at the
social security contribution assessment ceiling (for more information on the social
1Other than in the web survey, the income question was filtered by employment status in the CATI
survey.
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security contribution assessment ceiling see Chapter 2.1). Finally, we can only focus
on respondents who are employed according to the administrative data and receive
some income from labor. Seven strong outliers, five in the CATI and two in the web
survey mode, with a reported monthly income of at least e 10,000 were dropped,
leaving us with 1,234 and 381 respondents (see Table 5.1) for the item nonresponse,
and with 1,069 and 327 of item respondents for the measurement error analyses,
respectively.
CATI web
consenters 2281 662
after age validation 2260 658
received question 1509 658
without self-employed 1429 621
under assessment ceiling 1367 568
employed with income (administrative) 1239 383
response to income question 1074 (RR = 86.7 %) 329 (RR= 85.9 %)
employed with reported income < e 10.000 1069 327
Table 5.1: Case numbers for CATI and web.
In both surveys, the income question was asked in exactly the same way.2 The
only difference is that the web survey respondents received the additional request to
report the last income ever if they are unemployed at the time of the interview. We
used the standard question that is used in all surveys of the IAB because this question
is well tested and yields at the income that researchers are interested in. The question
wording is:
What was your employment income last month? In the case of multiple jobs
please calculate the total sum. Please indicate your gross income, i.e. your income
before the deduction of tax and social security contributions. If you had special
payments last month, such as a Christmas bonus or back payments, do not include
these. However, do include any pay for overtime.
For self-employed work please indicate your monthly profit before tax.
This question differs slightly from the information in the administrative data (see
Chapter 2) as the administrative data contains the income on a spell level, not on a
monthly level, and includes bonuses. Just like we did in Chapter 4, we make the
assumption that the bonus payments are negligible and that the income is constant
over the whole spell. By doing this, we are able to compute a respondent’s last
month’s income, and to validate the income question.
2For the German wording see Appendix A
77
5 Item Nonresponse and Measurement Error in Income Questions
1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu.
CATI 1,014 1,732 1,972 2,797
Web 1,272 2,121 2,230 3,039
Table 5.2: Summary of administrative income for CATI and web respondents.
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Figure 5.1: Kernel density estimates of administrative income for all CATI and web
survey respondents. Note that these also include respondents who did not
consent to data linkage and are not part of the further analyses.
As the cases were assigned to the modes randomly, the income distribution of the
gross sample does not differ between the samples. However, the income distributions
obtained from the administrative data differ substantively between the respondents
to the CATI and web survey (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2; the densities for the web
and telephone survey samples can be found in Appendix B).
Unit nonresponse analyses for these data show that the CATI respondents repre-
sent the general population quite well, and on aggregate do not show nonresponse
bias due to income or other socio-demographic characteristics (Felderer and Kirchner,
2013). In the web survey, however, individuals with a high income are overrepresented
while low-income people are underrepresented. The average income is higher in the
web survey than in the CATI survey, and there is more variation in the web survey
income (see Table 5.2). Note that the distribution is censored at the income limit (see
Chapter 2).
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show histograms of the reported income in the respondent
sample for each study, including nonconsenters to the data linkage question. For
readability, the graphs are focused on the range of e 0 to e 10,000. The reported
income shows much higher outliers in the web than in the CATI mode which is
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Figure 5.2: Reported income CATI.
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Figure 5.3: Reported income web.
probably due to the absence of control of an interviewer. In both modes, the usual
heaping to multiples of 500 and 1,000 can be observed.
We analyze item nonresponse and measurement error in the income question in
two steps: In the first step, we run logistic regressions for item nonresponse and linear
regressions for measurement error. In both models, we employ the same regressors,
i.e., administrative income and controls for both modes. Measurement error is thereby
defined as the difference between the reported and the administrative income,
Measurement errori = Income
reported
i − Income
admin
i .
As Kim and Tamborini (2012) show, the income effect is likely to differ with respect
to socio-demographic characteristics. Rather than running separate regressions for
the different income groups as in Kim and Tamborini (2012), we include interaction
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terms of administrative income and socio-demographic variables in every regression
model. For all models, polynomial terms are used for the administrative income. We
allow for polynomials up to the power of three and interactions of administrative
income with all covariates. The best models after AIC selection are presented in the
following sections. If the best model after AIC selection included interactions of a
control variable and one or more income polynomial terms, all remaining interactions
of the particular control variable and the income terms were added to the final model.
Selecting the models by AIC can lead to models containing different variables for the
CATI and web mode which can not be compared directly. Our aim is to find the best
prediction model for each mode by avoiding over-fitting which occurs if variables that
do not contribute to predict item nonresponse and measurement error are included.
Even though sample cases were randomly assigned to the survey modes, the actual
respondents differ between the web and CATI mode. Due to this self-selection, the
allocation of the respondents to the two modes is not random. If the relationship be-
tween the true administrative income and income misreporting is found to differ by
mode, this can have two possible causes: It may either be due to different reporting,
caused by different aspects of the survey mode, or by the fact that different individ-
uals respond to the survey modes. In order to attribute differences in the income
relationships between the surveys to the survey modes, we perform propensity score
matching to disentangle response and mode effects: For each respondent of the web
survey, we search for a telephone survey respondent who shares the same character-
istics as the web survey respondent, represented by her propensity score. Comparing
the web survey respondents to the respondents of the telephone survey – who could
just as well have answered the web survey if they would have been asked to – solves
the problem of self-selection, and it allows to interpret differences in income misre-
porting as being induced by the survey mode. A similar approach has been used by
Atkeson et al. (2014).
All models contain covariates available from the survey or administrative data.
Gender, age, employment status (full time employed, part time employed, vocational
training and mini job) are taken from administrative records, as well as unemploy-
ment benefit within the last 12 month (yes/no). The same holds for the length of
the current employment spell (with a maximum of 365 days, see chapter 2.1), and
an indicator whether the respondent has more than one job. Education (low, middle,
high) is taken from the survey. For all respondents who did not report the level of
education (less than 1%), we took the last available information on education from the
administrative records. Indicators for the spell duration and having more than one
job are derived from the administrative records and included in the models. This can
be justified by the fact that a relationship between ongoing job episodes and measure-
ment error has been found before (Kim and Tamborini, 2014) and as it might be hard
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to sum up income from different sources. The employment status is lagged by one
month as the income question refers to the previous month. There are a few respon-
dents who were not employed in the month of the interview but have been employed
in the month before. We therefore include an indicator for current employment in
the interview month (yes/no). Models also control for the positioning of the linkage
consent question (consent late: yes/no) where appropriate. The sample stratum is not
included as it is captured by “UB II in the last 12 month”.
5.4 Results
First, results for item nonresponse and measurement error are presented separately
for both modes. In the second step, propensity score matching is performed, and
results are presented for the combined sample of comparable CATI and web respon-
dents.
5.4.1 Income Nonresponse
From the set of possible covariates described above, we do not include the position-
ing of the consent question in the item nonresponse model as all respondents who
received the question after the experiment did reply to the income question. Also,
employment type is not included as “vocational training” predicts item response per-
fectly. For the same reason, current employment in not included in the model. For all
item nonresponse models, the effects of administrative income are shown per e 100.
In the telephone mode, administrative income is found to have a cubic association
with item nonresponse which is interacted with gender, age and education (see Table
5.3). The relation between income and item nonresponse heavily depends on the
covariates, but none of the effects is significant.
The final item nonresponse model for the web survey also contains a cubic effect for
administrative income and interactions with all control variables except for “multiple
jobs” (see Table 5.4). Even though all controls and interactions are selected into the
final model, only the effect of education is significant.
While we do not find a significant effect of income on item nonresponse in the
CATI survey, we find income to affect item nonresponse in the web survey. The effect
is moderated by education.
Our analysis does not confirm the often stated hypothesis of a general u-shaped
relation between income and item nonresponse. Rather, depending on the socio-
demographics, the effect of income on the item nonresponse propensity can have any
functional form from u-shaped to monotonic increase or monotonic decrease.
Different socio-demographic variables are found to influence item nonresponse in
both modes although none of the effects — except for education in the web mode
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Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) 2.9275 3.1304
admin income -0.4635 0.6211
admin income2 0.0122 0.0307
admin income3 -0.0001 0.0004
age -0.2273 0.1592
age2 0.0023 0.0018
low education 0.2509 0.9142
middle education 0.4795 0.9416
female -0.8106 0.7253
multiple jobs -0.4704 0.3167
admin income*female 0.1051 0.1122
admin income*age 0.0192 0.0304
admin income*age2 -0.0002 0.0004
admin income*low education 0.0370 0.1368
admin income*middle education -0.0409 0.1414
admin income2*female -0.0036 0.0050
admin income2*age -0.0005 0.0015
admin income2*age2 0.0001 0.0001
admin income2*low education -0.0029 0.0057
admin income2*middle education 0.0017 0.0061
admin income3*female 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*age 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*age2 -0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*low education 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*middle education -0.0001 0.0001
Table 5.3: Best model for item nonresponse in the CATI survey after AIC selection.
— is significant. The indicator for multiple jobs is only influential in the CATI mode
while UB II recipiency in the past 12 months and German nationality only affect item
nonresponse in the web mode. Whether these differences are due to the survey mode
or to differences between respondents of the modes will be studied in the second part
of the analysis.
5.4.2 Income Measurement Error
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the densities of the reported and administrative income for
item respondents for both modes. If all income was correctly reported, there should
be no difference between the reported and administrative income densities for each
mode. Also, in the case of classical measurement error with zero mean, these densities
should not differ. In order to facilitate interpretation, the graphs are focused on the
range from e 0 to e 10,000. For both modes, we can see that the general form of
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Figure 5.4: Kernel density estimates of reported and administrative income CATI.
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Figure 5.5: Kernel density estimates of reported and administrative income web.
the densities does not differ much between survey and administrative data, but the
density of administrative income shows heavier tales: there is more probability mass
in the extreme administrative incomes than for the reported income. This can be
especially well seen for the web survey. At first glance, the usual finding of mean
reversion is confirmed for our surveys.
In a bivariate analysis of the relationship between income measurement error and
administrative income, the mean reversion of administrative income is confirmed (see
Figures 5.7a and 5.7b). Both modes show a negative relation between measurement
error and administrative income, indicating overreporting of low and underreporting
of high income.
As can be seen from Figures 5.6b and 5.6a, income measurement error for both
modes is centered around zero, but is not symmetric. Both densities are left-skewed,
indicating more underreporting than overreporting of personal income. Moreover,
both densities show heavier tails compared to a normal distribution (see Figures 5.8b
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Figure 5.6: Kernel density estimate of measurement error.
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Figure 5.7: Scatter plots of measurement error against administrative income, includ-
ing fits of the nonparametric LOWESS smoother.
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Figure 5.8: Normal QQ-plots for income measurement error
and 5.8a). To conclude, income measurement appears not to be classical for our
surveys.
Applying regression models, we find our hypothesis for a mean-reverting effect
well confirmed for both modes (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). As for the item nonresponse
analyses, the effects of income are shown per e 100. The final models for both modes
contain cubic effects of administrative income that indicate a nonlinear negative rela-
tionship between income and measurement error. In line with the findings by Kim
and Tamborini (2014), we find income to interact with socio-demographic variables
which are different for both modes. German nationality, education and the consent
placement are only part of the web model.
To summarize, we find a mean-reverting effect of personal income on income mea-
surement error for both modes which interacts with socio-demographics. Different
variables are selected for the two modes which can either be due to the modes them-
selves or a consequence of the different sample composition.
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Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) 7.9962 8.9087
admin income -2.3367 2.9417
admin income2 0.1747 0.2373
admin income3 -0.0046 0.0058
age -0.0813 0.3508
age2 0.0007 0.0039
female -0.1759 1.6573
low education -2.6524 1.5271
middle education -1.5173 1.4658
german -3.1650 5.5755
duration -0.0126 0.0378
duration2 0.0001 0.0001
UB II -0.6537 1.7332
admin income*female -0.0732 0.3225
admin income*age 0.0348 0.0824
admin income*I(age^2) -0.0004 0.0009
admin income*low education 0.6366 0.3312
admin income*middle education 0.2631 0.3347
admin income*duration 0.0032 0.0099
admin income*duration2 -0.0001 0.0001
admin income*UB II -0.3155 0.8152
admin income*german 0.2453 2.2267
admin income2*female 0.0107 0.0181
admin income2*age -0.0017 0.0047
admin income2*age2 0.0001 0.0001
admin income2*low education -0.0288 0.0169
admin income2*middle education -0.0054 0.0188
admin income2*duration -0.0007 0.0007
admin income2*duration2 0.0001 0.0001
radmin income2*UB II 0.0445 0.0841
admin income2*german -0.0182 0.1991
admin income3*female -0.0002 0.0003
admin income3*age 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*age2 -0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*low education 0.0004 0.0002
admin income3*middle education -0.0001 0.0003
admin income3*duration 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*duration2 -0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*UB II -0.0011 0.0025
admin income3*german 0.0007 0.0051
Table 5.4: Best model for item nonresponse in the web survey after AIC selection
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Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -1285.2632 1172.9828
admin income 745.2523 372.0818
admin income2 -79.4458 38.3482
admin income3 2.5451 1.2172
female -45.4743 139.8164
age 20.7060 37.1323
age2 -0.3019 0.4147
low education -181.8462 47.6601
middle education -102.2887 42.1020
duration 9.4685 5.2073
duration2 -0.0177 0.0101
multiple jobs -202.4477 224.8641
mini job 144.4528 569.3743
part time employed 97.9364 280.8372
vocational training -556.7984 534.9677
currently employed 272.3660 713.0267
UB II -152.5408 164.1647
admin income*female -37.0095 22.5446
admin income*duration -3.9383 0.9535
admin income*duration2 0.0069 0.0018
admin income*mini job -332.2910 744.4997
admin income*part time employed -0.6770 44.0060
admin income*vocational training 176.6693 143.0741
admin income*currently employed -260.2319 322.5938
admin income*age 1.5987 6.9402
admin income*age2 -0.0131 0.0789
admin income*multiple jobs -2.8681 34.4497
admin income*UB II 26.5320 41.8437
admin income2*female 2.4839 1.0136
admin income2*duration 0.2528 0.0480
admin income2*duration2 -0.0004 0.0001
admin income2*mini job 173.3464 309.1067
admin income2*part time employed -1.1904 2.0592
admin income2*vocational training -22.0096 12.1033
admin income2*currently employed 47.0146 37.2301
admin income2*age -0.1259 0.3336
admin income2*age2 0.0012 0.0038
admin income2*multiple jobs 0.3256 1.5016
admin income2*UB II -1.5998 2.9715
admin income3*female -0.0388 0.0130
admin income3*duration -0.0040 0.0007
admin income3*duration2 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*mini job -23.7891 39.4074
admin income3*part time employed 0.0268 0.0289
admin income3*vocational training 0.6610 0.3008
admin income3*currently employed -2.0593 1.2109
admin income3*age 0.0031 0.0044
admin income3*age2 -0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*multiple jobs -0.0117 0.0189
admin income3*UB II 0.0158 0.0575
Table 5.5: Best model for measurement error in the CATI survey after AIC selection
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Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) 14844.4380 3397.9817
admin income -1925.5700 603.1857
admin income2 72.8616 29.2811
admin income3 -0.8377 0.4093
female -1403.8850 360.2275
age -147.9232 88.4484
age2 1.9442 0.9917
low education -573.0559 365.3022
middle education -1536.8686 353.7833
duration 24.0452 10.1689
duration2 -0.0550 0.0217
multiple jobs 1350.7542 543.0496
consent late -1124.1311 614.2310
mini job -1286.1191 1406.5819
part time employed -1225.3777 861.6029
vocational training -427.5727 7787.1301
currently employed -10144.3982 2687.0556
UB II 154.1615 704.4289
german -1200.5483 840.2121
admin income*female 112.5775 55.5503
admin income*age 24.0827 15.0946
admin income*age2 -0.3169 0.1751
admin income*low education 85.4285 61.7132
admin income*middle education 193.5686 53.1681
admin income*duration -3.8499 1.7161
admin income*duration2 0.0084 0.0036
admin income*multiple jobs -243.9202 85.8021
admin income*consent late 134.9359 102.6054
admin income*currently employed 1390.3504 488.3450
admin income*german 185.1068 116.3589
admin income*mini job -630.0925 1218.0657
admin income*part time employed 113.7696 108.2127
admin income*vocational training -566.2163 2710.1754
admin income*UB II 57.9335 226.2762
admin income2*female -3.1725 2.4785
admin income2*age -0.9830 0.6981
admin income2*age2 0.0129 0.0081
admin income2*low education -4.0621 2.7890
admin income2*middle education -7.1532 2.3031
admin income2*duration 0.1578 0.0854
admin income2*duration2 -0.0003 0.0002
admin income2*multiple jobs 11.7697 3.9149
admin income2*consent late -5.3460 4.2609
admin income2*currently employed -55.5534 24.7062
admin income2*german -7.7321 4.8168
admin income2*mini job 605.8969 469.8818
admin income2*part time employed -2.8178 4.2105
admin income2*vocational training 89.5642 303.9385
admin income2*UB II -10.7707 20.4371
admin income3*female 0.0285 0.0320
admin income3*age 0.0121 0.0091
admin income3*age2 -0.0002 0.0001
admin income3*low education 0.0480 0.0353
admin income3*middle education 0.0745 0.0288
admin income3*duration -0.0020 0.0013
admin income3*duration2 0.0001 0.0001
admin income3*multiple jobs -0.1673 0.0511
admin income3*consent late 0.0624 0.0478
admin income3*currently employed 0.6832 0.3652
admin income3*german 0.0889 0.0551
admin income3*mini job -90.2666 58.3169
admin income3*part time employed 0.0134 0.0507
admin income3*vocational training -3.3144 10.9492
admin income3*UB II 0.3828 0.5335
Table 5.6: Best model for measurement error in the web survey after AIC selection
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5.4.3 Causal Analyses of Mode Effects Using Propensity Score
Matching
Although the sample was randomly assigned to either web or telephone mode, par-
ticipation in both modes is not random. While the telephone sample is found to
show little nonresponse bias (Felderer and Kirchner, 2013), substantive bias can be
found in the web mode: Young and well-educated persons, and persons with high
income are over-represented in the web survey as compared to the sample frame.
Therefore, differences in response behavior between the samples are not necessarily
caused by the sample mode, they can also be due to different sample compositions.
To be able to causally attribute differences to survey modes, we perform propensity
score matching by searching for those CATI respondents who are most similar to the
web respondents by means of observed variables. By matching on the covariates, we
eliminate or at least reduce the relationship between respondents’ characteristics and
survey mode (Ho et al., 2007; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
As all socio-demographic information used in prior models is known to affect the
responses to different modes as well as data quality, all these variables and all possible
two-way interactions are included in the logistic model which is employed to estimate
the propensity scores. The final propensity model was chosen by AIC selection. We
perform a one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching, discarding respon-
dents from both modes who are not within the common support of the propensity
score. Figure 5.9 shows the estimated propensity scores for participation in the web
survey for web and CATI respondents.
In total, 367 respondents from the web survey were matched to 367 respondents
from the CATI survey. The 14 respondents from the web and 125 respondents from
the CATI survey whose propensity scores were outside the common support were
discarded from matching (see Table 5.7).
CATI Web
All 1,234 381
Matched 367 367
Unmatched 742 0
Discarded 125 14
Table 5.7: Cases used for matching.
Summary statistics of means and proportions of web and CATI variables before
and after propensity score matching can be found in Table 5.8. As can be seen, the
similarity of the two samples has been much improved for income, which is the most
relevant variable. The samples become very similar for age, UB II, having multiple
jobs, being currently employed, gender, and education. For employment type, the
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Figure 5.9: Propensities for being in the web mode for CATI and web respondents.
composition improves for some categories while becoming slightly less similar for
others. The distributions differ slightly more for spell length.
Variable samples before matching matched samples %xxxx
Web CATI Diff. Web CATI Diff. Improved
Register income 2,230.30 1,971.57 258.72 2,247.68 2,294.53 -46.85 81.89
Age 40.71 42.13 -1.41 40.66 41.16 -0.50 64.76
Female 0.52 0.54 -0.02 0.52 0.54 -0.02 8.45
UB II 0.10 0.19 -0.09 0.10 0.10 0.00 97.04
Multiple jobs 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.01 56.44
Currently employed 0.98 0.99 -0.01 1.00 1.00 0.00 100.00
Low education 0.15 0.30 -0.15 0.14 0.15 -0.01 92.74
Middle education 0.39 0.41 -0.02 0.40 0.39 0.01 46.57
Mini job 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.00 100.00
Part time employed 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.24 0.26 -0.02 -59.73
Vocational training 0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 -1,511.41
Spell length 308.55 316.06 -7.51 319.05 331.37 -12.32 -63.99
Table 5.8: Comparison of sample composition in web and CATI before and after
matching.
For the analyses of the matched data, we include the same covariates that have been
used before. Moreover, we add an indicator of survey mode as well as all possible
interactions of the other covariates with survey mode. The interaction between survey
mode and administrative income is of special interest, as this interaction indicates that
the effect of income and income measurement error is causally moderated by survey
mode. Final models are again found by AIC selection.
The final model includes a cubic effect of income, quadratic age and spell duration
effects, and it contains the indicators for multiple jobs and German nationality. While
the effect of spell duration does not differ between the modes, we find interactions
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Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -14.0854 601.1239
admin income 0.0610 0.0997
admin income2 -0.0025 0.0043
admin income3 0.0001 0.0001
age -0.1087 0.0876
age2 0.0015 0.0010
duration -0.0126 0.0086
duration2 0.0001 0.0001
multiple jobs -1.9336 1.0808
german 14.5566 601.1209
web 11.2075 601.1279
admin income*web -0.3074 0.1401
admin income2*web 0.0143 0.0063
admin income3*web -0.0002 0.0001
age:web 0.2549 0.1356
age2:web -0.0030 0.0016
multiple jobs:web 2.1220 1.1862
german:web -14.8054 601.1214
Table 5.9: Best model for item nonresponse in the combined sample, after AIC selec-
tion.
of mode and income, age, multiple jobs, and German nationality, though only the
income interaction is significant at the 5% level (see Table 5.9). The interaction effect
of income and survey mode indicates that there is a different response behavior that
can be attributed to the survey mode. Figure 5.10 shows the effects of income on
the item nonresponse propensity with all other variables kept at their means and
modes, respectively. For the CATI mode, we find a non-linear increase of the item
nonresponse propensity as income increases, while for the web mode the nonresponse
propensity is decreasing with income. The decrease seems to be non-monotonic for
the web survey. However, as this result is based on few observations only, it should
be interpreted with caution. Overall, we find the effects to strongly differ by mode,
but not in the way we would have expected from theory.
Measurement error is found to be affected by income, gender, age, education, spell
duration, having multiple jobs, and past receipt of UB II. Age, spell duration, and
multiple jobs are found to have different effects for different modes while the other
variables show the same effect in both modes. As there is no interaction of mode and
income selected to the model, we reject the hypothesis of differential income effect by
mode (see Figure 5.11).
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Figure 5.10: Effect of income on item nonresponse for CATI and web.
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) 375.6733 518.7056
admin income -39.5014 6.4559
admin income2 0.2691 0.1178
female -264.4946 51.6275
age 63.8916 21.7112
age2 -0.8216 0.2584
low education -169.2001 79.6823
middle education -114.2018 52.4539
duration -6.3031 3.1568
duration2 0.0120 0.0066
multiple jobs -410.6823 119.7530
UB II -147.6381 87.2746
web 1,350.1550 691.9428
age:web -114.9758 29.4121
age2:web 1.5908 0.3475
duration:web 5.5594 3.8646
duration2:web -0.0116 0.0081
multiple jobs:web 273.2557 169.4345
Table 5.10: Best model for measurement error in combined sample, after AIC selec-
tion.
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Figure 5.11: Effect of income on measurement error for CATI and web.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
We find that item nonresponse and measurement error in the income question are re-
lated to the true income in both modes. However, the effect of true income on income
nonresponse is highly dependent on other socio-demographic characteristics and can
have various forms. The often hypothesized general u-shaped effect of personal in-
come on income item nonresponse is not found in our study. The causal analyses of
mode on the item nonresponse propensity shows different effects of a person’s in-
come on item nonresponse between the modes. Whereas for the CATI mode the item
nonresponse propensity increases with personal income, we find a decreasing effect
for the web survey.
The finding of mean-reverting income measurement error – the tendency to report
an income that is closer to the mean than the true income – which is broadly reported
in the literature is replicated for both of our surveys. We do not find causal mode
effects on the relationship between income and income measurement error. This,
again, was not expected from social desirability theory. We rather expected to find
less rounding towards the mean in the web survey. Therefore, social desirability
might not be the main reason behind the mean reversion: respondents might just
give some rough estimate of their income which can lead to the same pattern. If
lack of knowledge is the main reason for measurement error, it makes sense that
there are no mode differences. Different issues can affect measurement error for
different respondents: whereas high-income respondents might just not know their
exact income, low-income respondents should be more aware of what they earn. The
correcting of low income towards some mean income can be due to social desirability
or fear of disclosure in the CATI survey, while it may rather be exclusively due to
fear of disclosure in the web survey. The motivation might be different between the
modes but still lead to the same pattern. We note that our data do not allow for deeper
analyses. In future studies, respondents could be asked for reasons not to report their
93
5 Item Nonresponse and Measurement Error in Income Questions
income. Moreover, they may be asked whether they have estimated their income, and,
potentially, which estimating strategy they have used.
The fact that both item nonresponse and measurement error in the income question
are related to true income leads to problems for all disciplines interested in income
effects, for instance when studying the returns of education or income inequality.
Further analyses of the mechanisms behind item nonresponse and measurement error
is needed to develop strategies to gain better data quality.
For the validation of the reported income, we needed to assume income to be stable
over an employment spell and bonus payments to be negligible. To make reported
and administrative income even more comparable, in a later web survey, “Heraus-
forderungen am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt 2014”, we asked the income question in a
way that exactly matches the administrative records. That is, we asked not only for
yearly income but also for the amount of bonus payments. Validation data for this
survey will be available as of the beginning of 2016. These data will help understand
whether the same relations found in this Chapter still hold for yearly (as opposed to
monthly) income. Finally, they will inform whether the negligible bonus and stable
income assumptions hold.
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Conclusions
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a deeper understanding of nonresponse and
measurement error. Linking survey data and administrative records gives us the great
opportunity to study both error sources individually.
One of our main focuses is the effect of incentives on these two error sources. For
the variables income and having a “mini job”, we find that, compared to conditional
post-paid lottery ticket incentives, unconditional prepaid cash incentives can be used
to increase response rates and to decrease nonresponse bias as these measures bring
more low-income cases and cases having a mini job into the sample (Chapter 3).
Therefore, prepaid unconditional cash incentives are promising for surveys that oth-
erwise underrepresent these groups. However, for surveys for which these groups are
already well represented or even overrepresented, prepaid cash incentives might lead
to a bias or increase an already existing bias. We also find some evidence that addi-
tional incentives within a survey can be used to reduce item nonresponse for some
questions.
Besides these encouraging results, there are some concerns about monetary incen-
tives that we did not cover in this thesis. One such concern addresses possible long-
term consequences of any cash incentive. For instance, if people get used to receiving
cash payments for their interviews, these incentives may set expectations, thereby de-
creasing the willingness to participate of formerly intrinsically motivated respondents
when they are not offered such cash incentives. Another concern is that of respon-
dents viewing monetary incentives as a compensation for the time spent on the survey
rather than a “token of appreciation”. Respondents who think of incentives as such
compensation for their opportunity costs might not be willing to participate when
receiving no or low cash incentives, and respondents of panel surveys might expect
the payment to increase over the waves of the panel.
The economic literature reports some evidence that incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation in economic decision experiments (Gneezy et al., 2011; Gneezy and Rus-
tichini, 2000; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). However, this has not been shown for
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survey participation (Laurie and Lynn, 2009). Moreover, Mercer et al. (2015) find no
evidence that the effect of a certain amount of incentive on response rates has de-
clined over the years. All in all, the empirical evidence is limited, and more research
is needed to understand the long-term effects of monetary incentives.
In a mode comparison, we find that the relationship between a person’s true income
and the propensity to report her income is different for the CATI and web mode,
respectively. However, misreport in income is found to be mean-reversive for both
modes. For our variable under study, there is no preferred data collection mode.
We have studied nonresponse and measurement error individually for this thesis.
A possible next step could be to analyze how these two error sources interact, and
how they jointly contribute to the total survey error. For the same survey as in Chap-
ter 5, the CATI and web survey “Work and Consumption in Germany”, in Felderer
and Kirchner (2013) we study the effects of survey mode on nonresponse bias and
measurement error both individually and in their joint effect on the sample means.
The question in this analysis is whether both error sources reinforce each other, i.e, if
their interaction leads to a higher TSE, or if they cancel out each other to some extent,
thereby decreasing TSE. In our study, we follow the work of Kreuter et al. (2008) and
Sakshaug et al. (2010) who disentangle the error sources and analyze the interaction
of both. Whether TSE is dampened or reinforced by the interplay of nonresponse bias
and measurement error depends on the direction and relative magnitude of both er-
ror sources. If nonresponse bias and measurement error have different signs, they can
cancel out each other and lead to survey estimates that are quite accurate. In Felderer
and Kirchner (2013), we study nonresponse bias by comparing survey respondents
and nonrespondents using administrative data (as in Chapter 3). Measurement error
bias is approached by comparing means which are computed based on the respon-
dents’ administrative records and means computed based on the respondents’ survey
data. In contrast to this thesis, we are not linking data on an individual level in that
study. We rather draw comparisons on an aggregate level, i.e., we compare means.
Thus, individual bias might be averaged out for the means and not be detected in
the analyses. Comparing survey modes, we find an overrepresentation of women in
the CATI mode, but no significant overrepresentation of women in the web mode.
As there is basically no measurement error in gender, combined bias in the estimated
proportion of women is only significant for the CATI mode. Similarly, older respon-
dents are overrepresented in the CATI, and younger respondents are overrepresented
in the web mode. As there is no measurement error in age, estimated mean age is
biased downwards in the web mode, and biased upwards in the CATI mode.
Both surveys overrepresent employed individuals, especially individuals having a
regular job (as opposed to having a “minijob”), and overrepresentation is higher in the
web than in the CATI mode. Both modes show measurement error in employment
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type: regular employment is overreported, while having a “mini job” is underre-
ported. These reporting errors are smaller in the web than in the CATI mode. We
conjecture that this finding may be explained by more accurate reporting due to less
social desirability concerns. Looking at TSE, we find that nonresponse bias is rein-
forced by measurement error bias for these variables. The comparatively lower bias
due to nonresponse in the CATI survey is counteracted by higher measurement er-
ror. Because nonresponse bias is higher than measurement error for both sub-surveys,
TSE in the CATI mode is still smaller than in the web survey. For income, we basically
find no nonresponse bias in the CATI survey, whereas the web survey overrepresents
high-income people while underrepresenting low-income people. When comparing
the aggregated survey and administrative data, we find the same mean-reversion that
we found for consenters on an individual level: too few respondents report to belong
to the highest income category, while too many respondents claim to be in the low-
income group. The high-income respondents are overrepresented in the web survey
while underreporting their income at the same time. Therefore, nonresponse and mea-
surement error counteract each other, leading to a TSE that is smaller than it would
be if no measurement error was present. For the CATI survey, we find the opposite:
measurement error increases the TSE. Even though measurement error is similar to the
web mode, the fact that there is no nonresponse bias to be compensated, measurement
error induces a bias that would not have been present otherwise.
In another study, Kirchner and Felderer (2015), we find that, despite this substan-
tive total survey error in means within both surveys, regression coefficients are not
biased very much. All in all, they capture the direction and relative magnitude of the
underlying true parameters quite well, even in the presence of nonresponse bias and
measurement error.
Administrative records offer the potential to study even more error sources than
we could address in this thesis. For example, coverage error could be studied using
register data of the FEA. We know that almost 90% of the workforce are captured by
the system, but not all of them can be covered by our survey as the address data and
phone numbers may not always be correct and up-to-date. Analyzing the relations
between returning invitation letters or outdated phone numbers on the one hand
and socio-demographics like education and income on the other hand could help to
answer the question of systematic undercoverage of certain subpopulations.
All measures used to increase response rates can in principle affect nonresponse
bias. Administrative records give a great opportunity to study this issue. For exam-
ple, different invitation letters might systematically attract different kinds of people,
thereby affecting biases.
Summarizing, administrative data keep many opportunities for future research
which may further improve the survey process.
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A
German Wording of the Intervention and
Questions in the “Work and Consumption in
Germany” Surveys
Intervention
No incentive, no request group
Abschließend möchten wir Ihnen noch ein paar Fragen zum Thema “Gesundheit und
Lebensstandard” stellen.
Request only group
Abschließend möchten wir Ihnen noch ein paar Fragen zum Thema “Gesundheit und
Lebensstandard” stellen. Wir möchten Sie bitten sich bei der Beantwortung dieser
Fragen noch einmal Zeit zu nehmen und in Ruhe nachzudenken.
Additional incentive groups
Abschließend möchten wir Ihnen noch ein paar Fragen zum Thema "Gesundheit und
Lebensstandard" stellen. Wir möchten Sie bitten sich bei der Beantwortung dieser
Fragen noch einmal Zeit zu nehmen und in Ruhe nachzudenken. Als Dank für Ihre
Mühen erhalten Sie von uns zusätzlich x Euro.
x = (0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5)
Questions Wordings
Health Block
Calories
The question was not taken from any survey.
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Was denken Sie, wie viele Kalorien benötigt ein durchschnittlicher Erwachsener Ihres
Geschlechts pro Tag?
. . . Kalorien
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Doctor Visits
Questions about doctor visits are for example asked in PASS and SHARE.
Haben Sie im Jahr 2011 einen Arzt aufgesucht? Wenn ja, geben Sie bitte an, wie
häufig.
Falls Sie im Jahr 2011 keinen Arzt aufgesucht haben geben Sie bitte 0 ein.
Dabei zählt jeder Arztbesuch, auch zum Abholen eines eigenen Rezeptes.
. . . Arztbesuche
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Diseases
The question is taken from the third wave of the German part of the SHARE survey.
The response options are ordered by the frequency they were named in the SHARE
survey. The last three options were added for our survey.
Hat Ihnen ein Arzt schon einmal gesagt, dass Sie unter einer der folgenden Krankheiten
leiden?
1. Herzinfarkt einschließlich Myokardinfarkt, Koronarthrombose oder andere Herzkrankheit-
ern einschließlich Herzinsuffizienz
2. Bluthochdruck
3. Hohe Cholesterinwerte
4. Schlaganfall einschließlich Durchblutungsstörungen im Gehirn
5. Diabetes oder hohe Blutzuckerwerte
6. Chronische Erkrankungen der Lunge wie chronische Bronchitis oder Lungenem-
physem
7. Asthma
8. Arthritis einschließlich Osteoarthritis oder Rheuma
100
9. Osteoporose
10. Krebs oder bösartiger Tumor, einschließlich Leukämie und Lymphdrüsenkrebs,
ausschließlich kleinerer Hautkrebserkrankungen
11. Magengeschwür, Zwölffingerdarmgeschwür
12. Parkinson’sche Krankheit
13. Grauer Star
14. Oberschenkelhalsbruch oder Hüftfraktur
15. Migräne
16. Nahrungsmittelunverträglichkeit
17. Allergie
Keine
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Life Expectancy
The question if taken from the German part of the SHARE survey.
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Sie [X] oder mehr Jahre alt werden?
Zur Beantwortung geben Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 ein. Sie können dabei
alle Zahlen von 0 bis 100 verwenden.
Beispiel:
Wenn Sie keinesfalls glauben, dass Sie [X] oder mehr Jahre alt werden, geben Sie die
0 ein.
Wenn Sie sich ganz sicher sind, dass Sie so alt werden, dann geben Sie die 100 ein.
Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.
0. . .100 Prozent
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Standard of Living Block
The question is taken from the PASS survey.
Income
Wie hoch war Ihr letztes monatliches Arbeitseinkommen?
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Bruttoeinkommen an, also Ihr Einkommen vor Abzug von Steuern
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und Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen.
Wenn Sie im letzten Monat Sonderzahlungen hatten, z.B. Urlaubsgeld oder Nachzahlun-
gen, rechnen Sie diese bitte nicht mit. Entgelt für Überstunden rechnen Sie dage-
gen mit. Für selbständige Tätigkeiten geben Sie bitte stattdessen Ihren monatlichen
Gewinn vor Steuern an.
Wenn Sie momentan erwerbslos sind, geben Sie bitte Ihr letztes Monatseinkommen
aus Ihrer letzten Erwerbstätigkeit an.
. . . Euro
War noch nie erwerbstätig
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Unemployment Benefit
The question is taken from the PASS survey. Haben Sie oder Ihr Haushalt in den
letzten 12 Monaten zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt Arbeitslosengeld II bzw. "Hartz 4" be-
zogen?
Ja
Nein
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
Employment History
This question is taken from the PASS survey.
Wenn Sie jetzt einmal an alle Erwerbstätigkeiten denken, die Sie bisher ausgeübt
haben, wie lange hat Ihre längste Phase der Erwerbstätigkeit gedauert, die Sie ohne
Unterbrechung ausgeübt haben?
Bitte geben Sie die Dauer Ihrer längsten Erwerbstätigkeit an, Arbeitgeber- und Beruf-
swechsel zählen dabei nicht als Unterbrechung.
Dauer in . . . Jahren oder/und
Dauer in . . . Monaten
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
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Standard of Living
The question is taken from the SHARE survey.
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Ihr materieller Lebensstandard in fünf
Jahren geringer sein wird als heute?
Zur Beantwortung geben Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 ein. Sie können dabei
alle Zahlen von 0 bis 100 verwenden.
Beispiel:
Wenn Sie keinesfalls glauben, dass Ihr materieller Lebensstandard in fünf Jahren
geringer sein wird als heute, geben Sie die 0 ein.
Wenn Sie sich ganz sicher sind, dass dies passieren wird, dann geben Sie die 100 ein.
Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.
0. . .100 Prozent
Weiß nicht
Keine Angabe
German Wording of the Income Question
Wie hoch war Ihr letztes monatliches Arbeitseinkommen? Bitte geben Sie Ihr Brut-
toeinkommen an, also Ihr Einkommen vor Abzug von Steuern und sozialversicherungs-
beiträgen.
Wenn Sie im letzten Monat Sonderzahlungen hatten, z.B. Urlaubsgeld oder Nachzahlun-
gen, rechnen Sie diese bitte nicht mit. Entgelt für Überstunden rechnen Sie dage-
gen mit. Für selbständige Tätigkeiten geben Sie bitte stattdessen Ihren monatlichen
Gewinn vor Steuern an.
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Additional Tables and Graphs
Cash Group Lottery Group
Variable CI - rel bias CI + CI - rel bias CI +
high income -1.10 2.25 5.54 1.44 5.34 9.19
middle income -3.60 -0.29 2.93 -5.18 -1.01 3.06
low income -5.25 -1.86 1.43 -8.84 -4.55 -0.37
age >= 60 -1.25 3.79 8.53 2.40 8.32 13.97
age 50-59 0.69 3.47 6.25 0.56 3.93 7.39
age 40-49 -0.60 1.82 4.23 -2.31 0.58 3.45
age 30-39 -6.07 -2.73 0.66 -6.49 -2.49 1.39
age < 30 -12.03 -7.56 -3.21 -16.94 -10.82 -4.89
foreign -6.61 -3.88 -1.20 -5.89 -2.41 1.00
mini job -4.73 -0.32 3.95 -10.05 -4.60 0.80
employed -0.91 1.31 3.46 -1.77 0.84 3.32
female -0.42 1.10 2.63 -2.09 -0.31 1.47
UB II -3.60 -1.64 0.23 -3.09 -0.53 2.02
Table B.1: Relative nonresponse bias estimates using administrative data.
Relative nonresponse bias estimates and 0.025 % and 0.975% quantiles using admin-
istrative data.
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Cash Group Lottery Group
Variable CI - rel bias CI + CI - rel bias CI +
high income -1.03 0.27 1.51 -0.58 1.02 2.53
middle income -1.33 -0.15 1.03 -0.71 0.81 2.30
low income -1.35 -0.09 1.09 -3.75 -1.95 -0.19
age >= 60 0.98 2.62 4.20 1.38 3.76 5.84
age 50-59 0.75 1.75 2.71 1.19 2.45 3.65
age 40-49 -0.31 0.61 1.49 -1.02 0.01 1.00
age 30-39 -0.80 0.28 1.31 -1.97 -0.63 0.68
age < 30 -8.07 -5.98 -4.16 -8.52 -6.08 -3.85
foreign -7.51 -4.69 -2.19 -3.13 -0.22 2.24
mini job -2.14 -0.53 0.95 -3.34 -1.61 -0.00
employed 0.31 1.12 1.96 -0.20 0.74 1.69
female -0.51 0.00 0.53 -1.22 -0.63 -0.04
UB II -2.01 -1.34 -0.69 -0.97 -0.16 0.64
Table B.2: Relative nonresponse bias estimates and 0.025 % and 0.975% quantiles using
survey data.
Variable Time to Answer
Proportion
item nonresponse
Proportion
insufficient answers
F-test Kruskal-Wallis Test
calories 0.456 0.934 0.235 0.095
doctor visits 0.985 0.906 0.001 0.684
diseases 0.184 0.302 0.28
life expectancy 0.518 0.772 0.157 0.098
income 0.556 0.732 0.063 0.421
UB II 0.127 0.652 0.872
employment 0.79 0.901 0.389 0.793
standard of living 0.938 0.933 0.696 0.767
sum over
all questions 0.613 0.951 0.210 0.504
Table B.3: Results for tests of equal means in response times and proportions of item
nonresponse between the experimental groups for all questions of the ex-
periment.
Variable Wrong answer in validation questions
F-test Kruskal-Wallis Test
income 0.203 0.215
UB II 0.313
employment 0.685 0.962
Table B.4: Results for tests of equal proportions of insufficient answers and wrong
answers to validation questions between the experimental groups for all
questions of the experiment.
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Figure B.1: Kernel density estimates of administrative income for all sample cases and
both survey modes. The densities of the administrative income are not
different for the telephone and web survey sample as the assignment to the
two survey modes was random for administrative income. Differences in
the administrative income distributions that are found for the respondents
of both surveys are only due to differential participation in the surveys.
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